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This thesis examines the Volunteer Graduate Scheme for Indonesia (VGS), a student-run 
initiative of the 1950s that sent idealistic and young Australian university graduates – 
including doctors, teachers, engineers, and scientific researchers – to work for the 
Indonesian Republic. Although less than fifty volunteers ended up serving in Indonesia 
through the Scheme, its cultural impact was profound: many ex-volunteers became 
leaders in their professions thanks in part to their experiences in Indonesia, the pool of 
experts who founded the academic discipline of Southeast Asian Studies in Australian 
universities were drawn heavily from the alumni of the VGS, and cultural organisations 
such as the Australian-Indonesian Association of Victoria were founded and run for 
decades by individuals who went through the VGS. The VGS also served as a precursor 
and model to other voluntary aid programs, such as the United States Peace Corps and 
British Voluntary Service Overseas, and is the ancestor of Australian Volunteers 
International.  More than this, through examining the VGS and placing it in its historical 
context, new perspectives can be added to the historiographies of Australian-Indonesian 
relations, the Cold War, and post-war conceptions of Australian identity.  
 
 
The thesis divides into four substantive chapters. ‘Background to the Formation of the 
Volunteer Graduate Scheme’ traces the developments within Australian society that 
made something akin to the VGS feasible and, to the individuals who founded it, desirable. 
‘The Volunteer Graduate Scheme and Australian-Indonesian Relations’ provides a short 
history of the VGS as it operated, and shows how the VGS represents a less-familiar 
perspective in the history of Australian-Indonesians relations than is normally presented, 
in which ‘world minded’ Australians rather than diplomats or experts spearhead 
interactions with Indonesian society. ‘The Cold War and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme’ 
examines the ways in which the Cold War – and anti-communism – influenced the 
development of the VGS and, by extension, the ways that Australians engaged with 
Indonesia and understood Indonesian society and their own actions. This chapter shows 
that although the Cold War is fundamental to understanding the events of this period, the 
driving force of actions were often more complicated than a simplistic communist / anti-
communist dichotomy. ‘Identity, White Australia, and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme’ 
provides two new perspectives on the formation of Australian national identity in its 
relationship with Asia in the Menzies era. The first section of this chapter looks at the 
impact of mass migration of non-English speaking European countries, and the ways in 
which the changes occurring within Australian society influenced the understanding 
Australians had of their own identity and place in the world. The second section looks at 
the roles that gender played in the VGS. Gender served as a complicating factor to the 
Scheme’s pursuit of intercultural friendship, with mixed-race intimate relationships a 
source of anxiety and pride, at different points. This section also shows how female 
volunteers themselves used gender and their experiences in Indonesia to offer a critique 
of the position of women in Australian society.   
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A conference, dedicated to surveying the previous fifty years of ‘Indonesia-Australian 
interactions’, was held at Flinders University in South Australia in 1995. Professor 
Herbert ‘Herb’ Feith, for decades a recognised authority on post-revolutionary 
Indonesian politics, focused his address to the conference on his recently deceased 
mentor and friend, Molly Bondan. Brilliant and passionate, she had served as 
President Sukarno’s chief English-language speechwriter and translator. Bondan had 
also served as a guide to the young Feith in his first forays into Indonesian politics. 
Even though their differences became quickly apparent – starting with their 
divergent views on Sukarno’s version of Indonesian nationalism – her impact on 
Feith was profound.  
 
But Feith’s address was more than a retelling of Molly Bondan’s unique impact on his 
life’s work. It was also an exploration of his own earlier idealism as seen from the 
distance of decades. Feith had served as documentarian, analyst, and participant-
observer as Indonesia moved from the democratic kaleidoscope of its National 
Revolution through to the authoritarianism of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and 
Suharto’s New Order military regime. He had dedicated his life to furthering cross-
cultural understanding, working with the world’s leading research centre on 
Southeast Asia at Cornell University before helping to establish the Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University, and later the magazine Inside 
Indonesia.  
 
Feith stressed that he and Molly Bondan shared similar backgrounds, in so far as they 
were both members of a ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-culture of 
worldmindedness and political renewal’ that had sprung up in Australia after World 
War Two.1 This was especially true of Feith who, as a student, had helped to establish 
                                                                    
1 Herbert Feith, “Molly Bondan: Pioneer, Mentor and Role Model,” in Half a Century of Indonesian-
Australian Interaction, ed. Anton Lucas, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph 6 (Adelaide: 
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an ALP Club at the University of Melbourne in opposition to the anti-Chifley, pro-
communist Labour Club already in existence. It was less true, though, of Bondan, who 
had significant difficulties with the Labor administration due to her marriage to the 
Indonesian nationalist, Mohammed Bondan, at a time when White Australia was still 
an orthodoxy harshly enforced.2 Feith also put forward the idea that he, Bondan, and 
their contemporaries were part of a ‘continuing story’: the ‘Australian-Indonesian 
honeymoon’ of the late 1940s.3 As we shall see, ‘honeymoon’ turns out to be a 
problematic description, but it does serve to bring into focus a new phase in 
Australia’s relationship with its ‘nearest northern neighbour’. 
 
The relationship between Australia and Indonesia has been one that has flown in the 
face of any belief in geographic essentialism: the idea that due to their physical 
proximity, Australia and Indonesia must have complex, meaningful, and lasting 
interactions. The historical record presents a different picture entirely. Prior to 
World War Two, if the Dutch East Indies occupied the minds of Australia’s 
inhabitants at all, it was as a place for occasional elite tourism and, in common with 
the other European colonies in Southeast Asia, as an apparently impregnable 
imperial bastion that stood between Australia and the dangers to the north. This 
illusion was dramatically shattered by the events of the World War Two and its 
aftermath. Within a few short years, the Netherlands Indies was first taken over by 
the Japanese and subsequently submerged by the forces of Indonesian nationalism, 
culminating in the international recognition of Indonesian independence at the end of 
1949. 
 
Feith was therefore correct when he identified the 1940s as the time that Australian-
Indonesian relations began in any meaningful sense. The war had brought thousands 
of Indonesians to Australia, many of whom responded enthusiastically to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Flinders Press and the Department of Asian Studies and Languages at the Flinders University of South 
Australia, 1996), 8–15. 
2 Renate Howe, A Century of Influence: The Australian Student Christian Movement, 1896-1996 (Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2009); Joan Hardjono and Charles Warner, In Love with a Nation: Molly Bondan and 
Indonesia (Sydney: Southwood Press, 1995). 
3 Feith, “Molly Bondan,” 12. 
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Indonesian declaration of independence. Australian society was faced with industrial 
war on the waterfront, where militant trade unions used their considerable influence 
to declare Dutch shipping ‘black’ in support of Indonesian nationalists.4 Union actions 
to support the new Indonesian republic continued right up to the transfer of 
sovereignty, while Australia also saw its first ‘student riot’ at a rally to condemn 
Dutch aggression.5 These actions, however did not lead to sustained engagement with 
the Indonesian cause. It was a false dawn rather than a honeymoon.  
  
Feith himself would play a lead role in promoting engagement with Indonesia. He did 
this by helping to establish a non-governmental scheme, which sent Australian 
graduates to Indonesia to fill professional roles left vacant by the departing Dutch.6 
Members of what became known as the Volunteer Graduate Scheme (VGS), these men 
and women pledged to live and work on absolutely equal terms as the Indonesian 
locals, and put ‘a stitch or two’ in the fabric of the new nation.7 Established under the 
auspices of the National Union of Australian University Students (NUAUS) at the 
beginning of the 1950s, the VGS was never as large – or as successful – as originally 
envisioned. It was later absorbed into the broader Overseas Service Bureau, which 
continues as Australian Volunteers International to this day.8 Along the way, it served 
as an inspiration for the much better known United States Peace Corps and British 
Voluntary Service Overseas, which took the new model of embedded technical 
assistance pioneered by the VGS and grafted it on to governmental policy.9  
 
                                                                    
4 Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada: Australia and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1942-49 
(Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1982). 
5 Alan Barcan, Radical Students: The Old Left at Sydney University (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 2002), 196–97. 
6 The VGS operated under several names including the Volunteer Graduate Scheme, Volunteer 
Graduates Abroad, the Volunteer Graduate Association for Indonesia, the Australian Scheme for 
Graduate Employment in Indonesia, and the Plan for the Employment of Graduates from Australia to 
Work as Indonesians or PEGAWAI. This dissertation refers to the Scheme uniformly as 'VGS' or 'the 
Scheme'. 
7 Betty Feith, “An Episode in Education for International Understanding. The Volunteer Graduate 
Scheme in Indonesia 1950 - 1963: ‘Putting in a Stitch or Two’” (Master of Educational Studies, Monash 
University, 1984), 9. 
8 “The Australian Volunteer International: Our Story,” Australian Volunteers International, accessed 
October 13, 2015, http://www.australianvolunteers.com/about-us/who-we-are/our-story/. 
9 Georgina Brewis, A Social History of Student Volunteering: Britain and Beyond, 1880-1980, Historical 
Studies in Education (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 176–79. 
4 
 
The impact that the VGS had on Australian understanding of Indonesian society was 
arguably unique.  Indeed, only the Australian National University’s Indonesia Project 
might be thought to have matched it. Established in the early 1960s, the Indonesia 
Project, with its (perceived) enthusiasm for supporting economic development to the 
detriment of human rights, fostered the so-called ‘Jakarta Lobby’ that advocated for 
better Australian relations with the New Order regime. Yet culturally, if not 
ideologically, the Project owed debts to the VGS, and even at its founding it was 
interacting with and absorbing the legacy of the earlier organisation. Colin Brown, of 
the Griffith Asia Institute, notes in his history of the Project that the economist Heinz 
Arndt consulted his ‘Melbourne-based colleagues’ about the Project in its proposal 
stage. During their discussions, his colleagues emphasised that ‘cultural knowledge 
and understanding’ underpins successful research. These Melbourne-based 
colleagues had all been involved in some way with the VGS: Herb Feith had been a 
volunteer, John Legge had been involved in the VGS since his time at the University of 
Western Australia, and Jamie Mackie was an active friend of the Scheme – though had 
not been a volunteer himself. Considering that Arndt never acquired more than 
conversational Indonesian, and recognised his own limited usefulness in Indonesian 
fieldwork, these words of advice no doubt ran counter to his own experiences in 
academia. This small interaction reveal something about the distinctive ethos that the 
VGS encouraged, at times in contrast to accepted wisdom. Despite these divergent 
philosophies, ex-volunteers and friends of the Scheme played an important role in the 
Indonesia Project from the beginning: Ken Thomas, who undertook two terms of 
service as a volunteer, became one of the first researchers attached to the Project.   
 
These early interactions, and the legacies of earlier generations, have had a long-
lasting impact on the way that knowledge has been structured and disseminated in 
the study of Indonesia in Australia. Robert Cribb, of the Australian National 
University, identified the tendency towards hegemonic ideas and ‘circles of esteem’ – 
scholars who respect each other, promote each other’s works and defend each 
other.10 The VGS was part of the foundational experiences for the first generation of 
                                                                    
10 Robert Cribb, “Circles of Esteem, Standard Works, and Euphoric Couplets,” Critical Asian Studies 37, 
no. 2 (January 2005): 289–304, doi:10.1080/14672710500106408. 
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specialists who would occupy positions in the academic fields of Indonesian and 
Southeast Asian Studies in Australia. Whether it was the flypaper that first brought 
like-minded people together or the glue that maintained a sense of community, the 
intellectual and ideological offerings tied to the VGS became standard fare in the 
academic and cultural marketplace of ideas.   
 
From the outside, the VGS might seem the perfect child of Feith’s ‘Chifley-admiring 
intellectual sub-culture of worldmindedness’. Formed as the Cold War redefined 
world politics in a way different from that earlier envisaged by the Atlantic Charter 
and the United Nations Organisation, it stuck true to the principles of ending unequal 
relationships between nations and people. To the Australian public, the Scheme made 
no apologies for its opposition to both the White Australia Policy and the racism that 
underpinned much of the global outlook of Australian society. Instead, the volunteers 
made explicit calls for “cranks” – the opponents of White Australia and racism 
marginalised by much of Australian society – to join them and make a difference.11 
The VGS married high idealism with practical action, making it a tantalising subject 
for the historian amidst the relatively barren social and political landscape of the 
Menzies era. Research into the VGS has the potential to impact on our understanding 
of the history of post-war Australian society, the ways in which white Australian 
society understood and integrated Indonesia into an expanding worldview, and the 
historical contingency of knowledge.  
 
In an Australia that appeared to have comfortably retreated under Menzies into a 
conceit of its Anglo-centric past, VGS activists made a bridge into a newly 
independent Asia. They demonstrated that Australian women and men, part of a 
rising generation of university graduates with new understandings of identity and 
belonging, could discard the insularity of the 1950s and display genuine enthusiasm 
for decolonisation and Asian nationalism.  
                                                                    
11 Ian Doig, “The Australian Scheme for Graduate Employment in Indonesia”, 04.11.1954, “Volunteer 




It is not surprising that university students played this role. Thanks to the Colombo 
Plan, universities acted as bastions of cross-cultural interaction in the heart of 
Australian cities.12 It was not unusual to see dozens or more students from Asia 
studying at any given Australian university.13 Less well known is the other side to this 
story: the role that these universities played in exporting Australian nationals to Asia, 
acting as a field in which the existing rules of intercultural interaction did not apply. 
Both groups – Asian students in Australia, and Australian graduates in Asia – were 
designed to be transient, but in both instances deeper bonds were forged.  
 
It was in this context that the VGS also seemed to signify a break with the Christian 
mission-based aid organisations that had been for many years the main form of 
interaction with the non-Western world, as well as one of the chief pillars of empire. 
The Victorian-era critic of empire, John Hobson, sardonically fused the moral, 
economic, and military interests behind imperialism in a seamless process: first the 
missionary, then the Consul, and last the invading army.14 The race to ‘save the 
heathen’ was a very real factor in the imperialism of the British world-system, though 
the exact connection between empire and missionaries is a source of continued 
controversy. A 2005 additional volume of the Oxford Handbook of the British Empire 
is dedicated to examining the interaction between Empire and missions in depth, 
while more recently a global history of humanitarianism by Michael Barnett has 
provided a new understanding of how humanitarianism transitioned from the 
imperial to the post-colonial era.15  
                                                                    
12 c.f. Julia Martinez and Adrian Vickers, The Pearl Frontier: Indonesian Labor and Indigenous 
Encounters in Australia’s Northern Trading Network (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015). 
13 The ‘Colombo Plan’ refers to the Colombo Plan for technical assistance for South and South-East 
Asia, initially an aid program for states in the Commonwealth of Nations that was expanded to include 
other newly independent developing states such as Indonesia. It was the flagship foreign technical 
assistance program that Australia contributed towards in the Menzies era. It sent foreign experts to 
developing nations to help with economic development, while many hundreds of foreign nationals 
were able to study in Australia through Colombo Plan-funded scholarships to attend Australian 
universities.   
14 John Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), 204. 
15 See Norman Etherington, “Introduction,” in Missions and Empire, Oxford History of the British 
Empire Companion Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–19; Michael Barnett, Empire of 




The VGS, with its professed internationalism and anti-racism, added new texture to 
this pattern. To be sure, the early volunteers were committed Christians. But they 
were not quite missionaries: in this time and place, these Christians rejected the 
sense of superiority of previous generations. Instead, their energy was funnelled into 
a secular organisation formed on a basis of cooperation, understanding, and equality 
with the non-Christians with whom they would work.  
 
Another key element in the history of the Scheme is the interaction between an 
avowedly apolitical non-governmental organisation, and the broader context of the 
Cold War. How these young people justified their actions within the wider context of 
the battle against communism is a question that needs to be explored. As the 
diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Western nations including Australia 
deteriorated, participants in the Scheme had to navigate an increasingly complex 
situation which challenged their idealism.  
 
This dissertation is structured around two areas of research. The first looks at the 
VGS and why it was organised at this particular time, in this particular form, and by 
these particular individuals. The VGS was not a spontaneous phenomenon, and this 
area of research identifies some of the themes and turning points which have had an 
impact on Australian-Indonesian relations. The second area of research takes the VGS 
as the point from which to look at two of the most significant factors in the 
development of politics and culture in Australia during the 1950s: the Cold War and 
White Australia. These two pillars of Australian foreign and cultural policy have been 
widely discussed, but the largely unexamined VGS is a near-perfect test subject with 





Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis has been structured thematically, with each substantive chapter dealing 
with a different aspect of the VGS. The first chapter covers the background to the 
creation of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme, and contextualises its importance. 
Through this, it provides a historical overview of the relationship between Indonesia 
and Australia up to 1950, as well as that of the Student Christian Movement, the 
NUAUS, and the key actors in the formation of the VGS, such as Herb Feith.  
 
The second chapter provides a history of the VGS from its inception up to the 
absorption of the Scheme into the Overseas Service Bureau, with a particular 
emphasis its impact on Australian-Indonesian relations. This history is told through 
individual stories and through the struggles of the organisation as a whole as it 
attempted to grow and sustain itself in the context of Indonesia’s post-revolutionary 
landscape and the VGS’ own shortcomings.   
 
The third chapter examines the effect of the Cold War on the Scheme. It highlights 
how the Scheme was drawn in to Cold War debates, and how the Scheme operated in 
an atmosphere of suspicion and anti-communism. The VGS encompassed a range of 
Cold War experiences across two nation-states, including having two applicants 
blocked by the Australian Government for suspected communist sympathies. This 
chapter underlines the danger in presenting either communism or Western anti-
communism as hegemonic and monolithic. 
 
The fourth chapter looks at the impact of the White Australia Policy and ‘identity’ – 
taken broadly to mean national self-identification, race, and gender – on the Scheme. 
This final substantive chapter challenges the tendency in the existing historiography 
to treat post-war Australian society as passive and interest in Asia as being driven 
almost wholly by reaction to outside events such as decolonisation. Instead, this 
chapter shows the internal dynamism of Australian society pushed Australians to 
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engage with Asia. This chapter also examines the peculiar way in which gendered 
anxieties, especially around interracial marriages, were influenced by the White 
Australia Policy and how interracial marriages in turn became a source of conflict 
with the Australian Government and pride for the volunteers.  
 
The research contained in this thesis is based largely on the collections held at the 
National Library of Australia (NLA) and the National Archives of Australia (NAA), 
complemented by material held in the archives of the University of Adelaide. The 
most significant of these, the records of the VGS at the NLA, contain minutes, 
advertisements, publications, and both personal and official correspondence. 
Importantly, this collection also contains numerous applications to participate in the 
VGS, allowing an assessment of the attraction that the Scheme held to a wider circle 
of individuals than the small core who actually participated in the project. Also at the 
NLA are the complete collection of the VGS’ quarterly newsletter Djembatan and the 
papers of Herb Feith, which contain copies of his regular letters to friends and family. 
These letters read almost as a diary of his adventures in Indonesia meant for those 
who knew him, mixed with Feith’s views on social and political matters of the day. 
While these collections represent the bulk of the sources for this thesis, the archives 
of the Student Representative Council of the University of Adelaide and the 
newspaper digitisation project by Trove have also contributed to building up a fuller 
picture of the Scheme.  
 
The decision was made early in the research process to prioritise the use of archival 
sources over the possible use of oral history sources. While many volunteers are still 
alive, with some still active in the successor projects to the VGS, the limitations of the 
Master of Philosophy degree (in tenure of candidature, structure, and word length) 
would have made it difficult to do justice to their histories. Further, what is of 
particular interest in this research is how the volunteers perceived the world at the 
time; less important is how they would reflect upon those views and experiences 
today. Luckily there has been renewed interest in the VGS in recent years, which will 
promote the preservation of oral histories in a way that this research has not done.  
10 
 
Throughout this dissertation, terms such as ‘white’, ‘White Australia’, ‘Indonesian’, 
‘Australian’, and ‘Western’, and concepts such as ‘development’ are used – advisedly. 
It should be recognised that these were and are not descriptors for fixed categories or 
subjects, but rather have always been open to negotiation and contest based on 
historical context and contingency.  
 
This dissertation stems from an interest in Herb Feith, whose remarkable life and 
passion for peace, justice, and intercultural understanding mark him out as a rarity in 
Australian history. Thanks to the time and circumstances in which he lived, Feith put 
his principles into action, with far-reaching impact. The VGS, though, is bigger than 
any one person. It came about in a specific time and place for a particular reason. 
Tracing the threads of the VGS reveal something deeper about the post-war history of 
Australian society and of Australian connections with Asia, both state-sanctioned and 
popular.  
 
State of Studies: The Historiography of the VGS 
This dissertation focuses on the VGS, which, taken on its own, has already been the 
subject of historical inquiry as well as works written about by a number of 
participants and people directly associated with Feith himself. Their laudable 
enthusiasm, and the myth making (in a good sense) that it engendered, has 
nonetheless left significant gaps in the existing literature: how best to historicise 
their contributions is one of the key issues which this dissertation sets out to address.  
The present study aims to break new ground, as its treatment of the VGS is informed 
by – and is integrated within – three broader historiographical frameworks: the 
evolution of Australian-Indonesian relations, the impact of the Cold War on the post-
war world – especially the role of aid and aid-givers to the emergent ‘Third World’, 




There have been several attempts to analyse the VGS and its significance, dating back 
to the time when the Scheme itself was operating. As an organisation, the VGS 
attracted individuals with a belief in the history-making mission of the program, and 
it was these individuals who went on create much of the organisation’s 
historiography. The earliest monograph on the VGS is Indonesia Face to Face by Ivan 
Southall, a curiosity from 1964 written by a sympathetic outsider.16 Southall was an 
established travel writer commissioned by the Overseas Service Bureau to write on 
the Scheme, and he travelled to Indonesia to interview participants and share their 
experiences.  
 
This book, despite being thoroughly researched, was not intended to be an 
academically rigorous work. Rather, it was an opportunity to combine a travelogue 
with the story of the VGS. It served the purpose of opening Indonesia to casual 
readers, de-mystifying what was still a much-mythologised ‘East’ through interviews 
with serving and former Australian volunteers. Southall toured several places in 
Indonesia, quoting verbatim the Australians with whom he spoke and shedding light 
on the issues of intercultural relations. He aimed to present the lived experience of 
participants as they discussed race, marriage, money, and Indonesian society, while 
at the same time describing the blunt sensory otherness of the archipelago, inter alia 
the stench of the Jakarta canals and such tropes as ‘colourful’ traditional dances. As 
an author, he had the added advantage of being able to contextualise his experiences 
and interviews in Indonesia with access to the correspondence that Scheme 
participants sent back to Australia. 
  
Aside from its non-academic nature, there are several elements of Indonesia Face to 
Face that make it deserving of the label ‘curiosity’. It is a work most definitely of its 
time. Written from experiences that took place during the authoritarian Guided 
Democracy era, it is difficult to grasp from its account of the VGS much of the early 
enthusiasm and singular focus on participating in the nation-building process. By this 
time, Sukarno – at least in the minds of the Australian public – was tied to the ongoing 
                                                                    
16 Ivan Southall, Indonesia Face to Face (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1964). 
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Malaysian confrontation that had soured Indonesia’s international relations, and a 
despot and demagogue to boot.17 Southall saw the VGS at a low ebb, as it was being 
subsumed into the Overseas Service Bureau and losing its focus on building the 
bridge between Indonesia and Australia. This period was a transition point, leaving 
Southall’s experiences unlike those that would follow, but markedly different from 
the experiences of the participants of the preceding years.  
 
After Southall’s work, there is a gap in discussion of the Scheme until 1984, when 
Betty Feith, Herb Feith’s spouse, submitted a Masters dissertation focused on the 
Scheme at Monash University.18 This represents the first attempt to grapple with the 
VGS in an academically rigorous form. Entitled An Episode in Education for 
International Understanding. The Volunteer Graduate Scheme in Indonesia 1950-1963, 
it was written with the authority of the participant-observer. Betty Feith had been 
instrumental in establishing the Scheme, and had served as an English language 
instructor for the Indonesian Department for Education through the VGS.19 
Straddling the divide between historian and memoirist, she was able to access 
privately held papers and call upon the recollections of many of the people who went 
through the Scheme – attested to by ‘Appendix A’ of her work.20 This appendix is a 
complete list of volunteers who served in Indonesia from 1951 which notes 
individuals with whom she had maintained contact up to the submission of the 
dissertation (over 60% of the total number). An Episode will be reproduced as part of 
a forthcoming release in the Herb Feith Translation Series by Monash University 
Publishing.21 
 
While doing much to lay the groundwork for an understanding of the VGS, An Episode 
is not, nor does it claim to be, a complete history of the Scheme. Feith’s main concern 
                                                                    
17 Nancy Viviani, “Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards Indonesia, 1950 - 1965” (Ph.D Thesis, 
Australian National University, 1973), 257–69. 
18 Feith, “An Episode.” 
19 Her experiences are summarised in Southall, Indonesia Face to Face, 175–76. 
20 Feith, “An Episode,” 62–65. 
21 Ann McCarthy and Ailsa Zainu’ddin, eds., Bridges of Friendship: Reflections on Indonesia’s Early 




is the motivations of the participants – the ethos underpinning the VGS – and the 
issues that participants faced in matching principles with reality.22 This is entirely 
expected for dissertation in the field of educational studies, but leads to the 
downplaying of any analysis of the Scheme and its relationship to the historical 
context in which it operated. The role of the Cold War, party politics, religion, race, 
and gender are all touched upon, but not all are analysed in depth. The deep 
connection that Betty Feith had with the Scheme also makes this a work that is 
reflective of the shortcomings of the Scheme but, perhaps, not critical enough. This 
leaves the dissertation, while academically rigorous, just as valuable as a primary 
source as it is as a secondary one.  
 
The untimely death in 2001 of Herb Feith, in an accident at a rail-crossing in 
suburban Melbourne, renewed interest in the VGS as part of the memorialisation of 
the man and his work. From Vienna to Yogyakarta by Jemma Purdey, an Australian 
Research Council-funded biography of Herb Feith, was published in 2009 alongside 
papers for the Herb Feith Foundation and the Monash Asia Institute.23 From Vienna 
dedicates significant space to the VGS, due to the formative impact that the Scheme 
had on Feith’s life, and Purdey pays due care to the religious elements of Feith’s 
motivations and life.  However, the author did not set out to construct a history of the 
VGS, and by framing her analysis of the Scheme within the life story of one man, for 
whom the author clearly has great respect, Purdey does not critically engage with the 
questions outlined in this dissertation. Despite this, Purdey has produced the most 
comprehensive research on the VGS to date.  
 
The VGS also appears in Visiting the Neighbours: Australians in Asia by Agnieszka 
Sobocinska, though only in a superficial manner and as part of a wider narrative of 
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Australian experiences in Asia.24 By placing the Scheme within the broader story of 
Australian aid and humanitarian interactions with Asia, Sobocinska, who is the 
deputy director of the Centre for Australian Studies at Monash University, 
demonstrates the Scheme’s place as a pioneering non-governmental link between 
insular Australia and Asia. More recently, the VGS was the subject of a 2016 article by 
Sobocinska, entitled ‘A New Kind of Mission: The Volunteer Graduate Scheme and the 
Cultural History of International Development’.25 Sobocinska situates the VGS within 
the global history of humanitarianism, emphasising its importance to the 
development of the US Peace Corps and to the British Voluntary Service Overseas. 
This thesis approaches the VGS from a different angle, instead situating the VGS first 
and foremost within the specific context of Australian society of the post-war years. 
This has led to divergent analyses on some aspects of the Scheme. In particular, 
Sobocinska’s argument about the minimal impact of the Cold War on the VGS is one 
that will be challenged in the discussion that follows.26 
 
Although the historical literature relating directly to the VGS remains limited, the 
wider context in which the Scheme operated falls within a more substantial body of 
work, relating to Australian-Indonesian relations; the Cold War in Australia and 
Southeast Asia; and the politics of race, national identity, and gender in the post-war 
Australia. Elements of the relevant historiographies, and where the VGS may fit 
within these larger historiographical frameworks, will be discussed at the 
appropriate place in the chapters that follow. Before these concepts can be tested, 
this thesis first returns to the various historical threads that were woven together to 
create the Scheme: the tenuous relations between Australia and the Indonesian 
archipelago up to 1950; the development of the Student Christian Movement as an 
activist force in Australia’s universities; and the handful of ‘world minded’ idealists 
who could envisage a new method of engagement with former colonies in post-war 
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Asia. As outlined in the chapter below, these are the pre-existing strands of Australian 





1.  The Formation of the Volunteer Graduate Scheme. 
The concept of a graduate employment scheme to assist the new Indonesian republic 
was endorsed by the national conference of NUAUS in early 1951. Its endorsement on 
paper was the culmination of lobbying and enthusiasm, but other factors were 
fundamental to ensuring that it succeeded in the context of post-war Australian 
society. Firstly, the birth of modern Indonesia during the course of the 1940s 
encouraged the search for deeper interactions such as those imagined by the VGS. 
Interactions shifted from being limited and peripheral to a new phase of relative 
intensity during World War Two, when substantial numbers of Indonesians came to 
reside in Australia. This led to the so-called ‘honeymoon’ period of the late 1940s, 
which saw elements of Australian society actively engage with Indonesian 
nationalism.  
 
In the second place and contemporaneously, the Australian Student Christian 
Movement (ASCM) provided a shared ideological background, national 
infrastructure, and network of influence to deliver a project of this size. Composed 
mostly of middle-class, liberally-minded Protestants imbued with teachings around 
social justice and serving the community, the ASCM had, for many years, incubated 
community projects in the same vein of ‘practical action’ as the VGS. The third and 
final element necessary for the success of the VGS was the specific cohort of 
Melbourne-based students that developed the concept of ‘embedded technical 
assistance’. It was they, most notably Herb Feith, who were willing and able to flesh 
out this novel idea into a sustainable project. These three elements interacted with 
each other to create the conditions that made the VGS both theoretically conceivable 
and organisationally feasible by the beginning of 1951. 
 
Due to the exceptional situation that the war had produced, Indonesia presented a 
significant challenge to Australian society’s relative's insularity from Asia.27 
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Following the war, Australia became a site of struggle for the Indonesian Revolution, 
and the events of this time have laid the foundation for an enduring and politically 
useful myth of Australian support for Indonesia, discussed below.28  It is this period 
that has been referred to as the 'honeymoon’ period in Australian-Indonesian 
relations.29 This phrase, found in the works of Margaret George and Herb Feith 
himself, is used to describe an argument that there was an upsurge in popular 
sympathy for Indonesian nationalism and independence within Australia in the late 
1940s, allied to support for the new international order represented by the United 
Nations. This is not an unchallenged view. 
 
Nancy Viviani, the Foundation Director of the Centre for Asian-Australian relations at 
Griffith University, submitted a doctoral thesis in 1973, entitled “Australian Attitudes 
to Indonesia 1950-65”, that provides plentiful information on public discussion about 
Indonesia during this period.30 Viviani’s central contention was that popular support 
in Australia for Indonesia, both during the independence struggle and after, was 
always lukewarm at best. Viviani used public opinion polls, newspapers articles, 
interviews with interest groups, and analysis of their published positions to reach the 
conclusion that support for Indonesia (or sympathy for the Indonesian position in 
international disputes) was neither deeply nor widely felt. Even so, it may be 
suggested that historically subsequent issues such as the dispute over competing 
claims for sovereignty of West New Guinea and the so-called konfrontasi coloured 
subsequent recollections of the less conflict-ridden period of Australian-Indonesian 
relations during the early years of independence. 
 
To understand the formation of the VGS, and what contributed to the successful 
adoption of this concept for an aid project likewise requires a return to what the field 
of Australian-Indonesian relations looked like, prior to the disappointments and 
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conflicts of later years, and the changes in Australian conceptions of Indonesia and 
Indonesians in the lead up to 1950.  
 
Australian-Indonesian interactions up to 1950 
Up to the outbreak of World War Two, the historical relations between the people 
inhabiting the Netherlands Indies and Australia were broadly characterised by 
disconnection, apathy, and marginality. Both the Dutch and the British remained 
firmly entrenched in their respective imperial networks. Within some strands of 
Australian colonial thought, the eastern islands of the Indonesian archipelago, 
sometimes as far west as Lombok or Bali, represented the outermost boundary of the 
discrete continental unit of ‘Australasia.’ This was justified by the cartographic 
assertion of the ‘Wallace Line’, which gave this border a pseudo-scientific and 
seemingly natural basis.31 While there were occasional calls from Australian colonists 
to assert white British control over all of Australasia and rule it as an ‘empire of the 
southern seas’, no concrete movements towards expansion or challenging Dutch 
imperial claims over the eastern islands ever arose from these visions.32  
 
Concerns over security and national defence also played a role in Australian 
governmental attitude towards the Indies. The Dutch community, and its press in the 
Indies, were supportive of the Boer Republics during their war with the British 
Empire at the turn of the century, in contrast to the imperialist fervour of the 
Australian colonies.33 The Australian Government considered the Dutch population of 
the Indies as a potential threat during World War One, due to the prevalence of 
sympathy for the German cause in officially neutral Netherlands.34  
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Despite the extent to which regular shipping services between Australia and the 
Indies from the late nineteenth century onward increased the potential for economic 
and social interaction, these interactions remained minimal and governed largely by 
the positions of the Indies and the Australian colonies in the world markets.35 Two 
shipping lines ran regular services between Australia and the Indies, but Australian 
merchants and politicians showed only sporadic interest in developing deeper 
interactions.36 In the decades after Federation, Australian business interests showed 
a limited understanding of, nor interest in, Indies society. A ‘goodwill’ tour of the 
Indies in the 1930s by the Manufacturers’ Association of Australia ended in failure: 
not only did Australian industry face stiff competition from the products of other 
countries, the Australians were only interested in the comparatively small ‘European’ 
population of the Indies – the designation for a population of which a majority were 
mixed ethnicity. Australians were dismissive and patronising towards the majority 
and considered themselves racially distinct from most of their ‘European’ peers of the 
Indies.37 During this same inter-war period, university-based intellectuals, taking the 
lead from overseas trends, established branches of the New York-centred Institute of 
Pacific Relations as well as an Australian affiliate to the British Institute for 
International Affairs. These groups encouraged research on regional issues, and while 
the implicit message of the output from the Sydney-based Institute for Pacific 
Relations before World War Two was that ‘Australia could offer very little to the 
populations of Asia’, the Melbourne branch of the Australian Institute for 
International Affairs entertained ‘unprejudiced’ analysis of Asian nationalism, its 
causes and prospects.38   
 
While this disconnection and apathy towards the archipelago was prevalent in the 
populated temperate zones of the Australian continent, a different dynamic can be 
seen in the tropical north. Among coastal communities, pre-existing – albeit small-
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scale – trading networks between indigenous Australians and Southeast Asia 
continued after these regions were absorbed into the white colonial ‘frontier’. The 
tropical zones of Australia were also the geographic location in which industries such 
as pearling used indentured labour from the archipelago, while other industries 
experimented with imported ‘coolie’ labourer from Southeast Asia for intensive 
tropical work.  
 
Indigenous connections with the Indonesian archipelago were well-established long 
before the arrival of Europeans in northern Australia. For generations, trading 
networks in the tropical north of the Australian continent centred on the export of 
trepang, a type of sea cucumber, to Southeast and East Asia. This brought with it 
intensive links between the people of Arnhem Land and the eastern islands of what is 
now Indonesia that brought about the exchange of goods, people, and ideas.39 From 
1860 onwards, pearling became a key industry in some coastal frontier towns such as 
Broome, and the success of this industry was reliant upon divers and luggers drawn 
mostly from West Timor. The indenture system survived Federation and the 
adoption of the Immigration Restriction Act, the centrepiece of the White Australia 
Policy, on the grounds that the work was considered so dangerous and undignified 
that it was unworthy of the white working class.40 The pearling industry saw white 
Europeans cross borders for the recruitment of labourers, as well as lasting 
interactions between white, Asian, and indigenous communities in frontier towns.41 
While racial segregation in the community became a significant concern as the white 
population in the north increased in the 1920s, the enforcement of racial hierarchies 
was, at times, lax. Inter-ethnic sporting events in Darwin, for example, drew the ire of 
the Indies Government, which viewed them as subversive. Intimate relationships 
between indigenous Australians and indentured labourers were not uncommon, and 
led to the formation of racially and culturally mixed communities around Darwin, 
Broome and some islands of the Torres Strait.42 
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Elsewhere, attempts to introduce Southeast Asian labour failed in the face of race-
based opposition. In Queensland there was an experimental introduction of Javanese 
labour to the cane fields, based on the racialist assumption that such people were 
naturally adapted to demanding tropical work.43 Wealthy plantation owners put 
forward visions of establishing themselves as ‘white Rajahs’ of north Australia.44 
These projects failed in the face of a backlash against non-white labour, which was 
thought to undercut pay and conditions, and more general racial anxieties that flared 
into race riots targeting Javanese labourers.45 These experiments became moot with 
the implementation of the White Australia Policy, which foreclosed the option of 
cheap imported labour.      
 
The downward push of the Japanese armed forces in 1941-2, whose war against 
China had expanded into a war for dominance over Asia, proved the catalyst for 
ending the marginalisation of interactions between Australians and the people who 
now began to describe themselves and be described as Indonesians. This was to have 
a major impact on perspectives in Australian society about Australia’s ‘northern 
neighbours’ and on what was soon to be transformed by national revolution into 
Indonesia. The pace of Japanese advance in early 1942 was shocking to Western 
observers, Australians among them. Unable to withstand the offensive, Dutch colonial 
authorities evacuated to Australia and established a colonial government in exile. 
Indonesian civil servants, house servants, soldiers, sailors, and their families found 
themselves in Australia alongside Dutch officials and officers.46 The colonial 
authorities also arranged for the transfer of political prisoners and their families from 
isolated prison camps in the Indies to Australia, afraid that they would collaborate 
with the Japanese. In all, it is estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 Indonesians 
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found themselves in Australia, and unprecedented new cultural attachments and 
interactions grew from this wartime situation.47  
At its most direct, the war shifted the limited interactions of Australians and 
Indonesians from the periphery to the centre of white Australian society, where 
racial hierarchies were not as clear or uniformly policed.48 The war provided the 
space for casual encounters between Indonesians and white Australians without the 
need to negotiate colonial strictures, allowing bonds to form and racial equality (or at 
least tolerant and harmonious co-existence) to be legitimised, at least incipiently. On 
a larger scale, the Atlantic Charter, which proposed a new world order governed by 
principles of equality, national self-determination, and universal freedoms, became 
an important ideal as well as providing a new language which Australian activists 
deployed in their pursuit of a stronger bond with Indonesia. 
 
Christian community groups in Australia played a key role in this. The Port 
Melbourne Methodist Church acted as patron of the men and women who arrived in 
Victoria: coordinating the billeting, healthcare and welfare of the newly arrived.49 The 
Roemah Indonesia (“Indonesia House”) was established as a community centre for 
Indonesians at the Hotel Metropole in the working class, inner-city suburb of Fitzroy 
in Melbourne, and other Roemah Indonesia were subsequently established in Sydney 
and Brisbane. These venues played host to cultural events that were open to non-
Indonesians, and represented the first time that steps towards intercultural 
understanding were attempted in any significant manner.50 
  
The war years were also the first time that concern for Indonesian welfare was 
clearly demonstrable in the Australian community. While the bulk of this involved the 
provision of basic welfare, such as clothing and shelter by community groups, it also 
included political actions taken in response to Indonesian grievances. The political 
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prisoners who had been transferred from the Dutch East Indies became a significant 
issue after the Civil Rights League protested their detention, and attention was drawn 
to them by the Communist Party’s Tribune.51 Australian trade unions also intervened 
in disputes between the Dutch and their colonial subjects over pay and conditions, 
recognising the need to support workers regardless of race.52   
 
As the war in the Pacific entered its final years, attention turned to post-war 
reconstruction, the new world order that would be established with the defeat of the 
Axis powers, and the relationship that Australia would have with post-war Asia. In 
November 1944, the activist Molly Bondan (née Warner) organised a meeting 
between community groups to discuss the formation of an Australian-Indonesian 
Association, to continue the relationship that had developed between Indonesians 
and Australians due to the war. The association that came out of this meeting was 
broad-based, including the Council of Churches, the Civil Rights League, the 
University of Sydney and the NSW Trades and Labour Council.53 Although this 
organisation was originally envisaged as an apolitical entity, it quickly came to adopt 
a political philosophy that was radical in nature. The association’s statement of 
principles included a belief that ‘to implement the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, 
including the principle of freedom of determination of their own future in a 
democratic way, is the surest guarantee of a progressive and prosperous Indonesia’.54 
This call to respect the principles of the Atlantic Charter was mirrored by student 
groups who were engaged politically on international affairs. On racial matters there 
was also a rapid and noticeable shift, with the aims of the association morphing from 
‘promoting an interest in Asia through culture and education’ to ‘meeting Indonesians 
on the same basis as it does all the people of the freedom-loving world, and on this 
foundation of equality … cultivate friendly cultural, social, and trading relations’.55  
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The Indonesians temporarily residing in Australia were not immune from the rise in 
nationalist sentiment that erupted across Southeast Asia in the wake of the war. 
News of the 17 August 1945 Indonesian declaration of independence was broadcast 
by shortwave radio to Australia, and Indonesian desertions from the Dutch wartime 
establishment in Australia began within two days.56 The Indonesian Seamen's Union, 
a radical nationalist trade union with many supporters in the Indonesian community 
in Australia, had been monitoring radio broadcasts from the Indies when the 
Republic was declared. The results were near instant. With the support of Australia's 
maritime unions, the Indonesian unionists had resolved to mutiny, and by early 
September 1945 several thousand Indonesian sailors were refusing to work the 
Dutch-controlled ships. On 23 September the unions representing Australian sailors 
and dockworkers joined in the conflict and declared all Dutch ships destined for the 
Indies 'black' – no union member would work them.57 During this period, activists 
within the Australia-Indonesia Association acted in solidarity with the Republic, 
providing support and accommodation for mutineers and joining with Indonesians to 
incite docked crews to join the strike.58 In the face of determined opposition from an 
alliance of their own workers, foreign trade unions, and nationalist supporters in 
Australia, the Dutch could not move their own forces and supplies to reassert power 
in the Indies for many vital months. In total, 31 Australian unions joined the strike, 
and the bans were retrospectively endorsed by the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions. Eventually, a small union of coal lumpers (comprising around 30 members) 
was induced to break the ban in mid-1946, and Dutch ships limped out of Australian 
ports crewed by ex-internees and military personnel. It was 11 months after the 
declaration of independence that the last Dutch military ship left Australia.59  
 
Without direct contact with Indonesians, who were rapidly deported by the 
Australian Government, engagement with the ongoing nationalist struggle in 
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Indonesia subsided. Yet subsequent Australian responses to the so-called ‘Police 
Actions’ – attempts by the Dutch to enforce a military resolution to their fight against 
the Indonesian Republic without a formal declaration of war – demonstrated that 
there was still a sense of affinity in sections of the Australian community. Australia 
experienced its first ‘student riot’ during a rally in support of Indonesian 
independence in 1948, and retaliatory trade union bans were once again placed on 
Dutch shipping.60 This student protest was a sign of a resurgent political life on 
campuses in Australia, with the ASCM playing a principal role.  
 
The Australian Student Christian Movement: Ideology, Infrastructure and 
Networks 
The founders of the VGS could draw upon a rich history of student activism, turned 
outwards to global issues and which emphasised the role of individuals taking 
practical action. They were active in the ASCM, a non-denominational Christian 
organisation formed in the nineteenth century. The ASCM boasted global links and 
branches at every Australian university, as well as most other post-secondary 
education institutions such as teachers’ training and agricultural colleges.  
 
Activists interested in international affairs found in the ASCM a body that provided an 
ideological understanding of international relations, and in which individual action 
was celebrated as a key component of faith. The ASCM also provided an organisation 
in which a tradition of mission work dedicated to ending social and economic 
inequalities rather than proselytising could be drawn upon, even as traditional 
mission work was confronted with a new world order in which missionaries could no 
longer rely upon support from colonial and imperial regimes. On an administrative 
level, the ASCM was a ready-made national organisation, with branches in every state 
and experience in managing projects. This infrastructure meant that a program such 
as the VGS could move from idea to reality.  
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More than this, former ASCM leaders were in positions of influence, and support from 
the ASCM could provide the VGS with credibility. Many of the ex-ASCM individuals 
who entered the service of the Curtin and Chifley administrations, such as the 
Solicitor-General Kenneth Bailey, were permanent public servants who retained 
authority after the 1949 election. This presented a formidable toolkit of ideology, 
infrastructure, and networks for the individuals who wished to build the VGS. 
 
Founded in 1896 as the Christian Union, the ASCM drew direct inspiration from the 
American evangelical missionary tradition. One of its foundational principles was ‘to 
enlist students in the work of extending the Kingdom of Christ throughout the whole 
world through training for home and foreign missions’.61 An ancillary organisation, 
the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, promoted international 
mission work for graduates in the years up to World War One. According to the 
American founder of the Student Christian Movement, the mission work that 
Australians would undertake was ‘nothing less than the laying of secure foundations 
for what is destined to become a mighty Christian empire in the southern seas’.62  
 
While the ASCM was headquartered in Sydney, the Student Volunteer Movement was 
located in Melbourne, and worked with existing missions to place volunteers with 
pre-existing denomination aid groups. Anglicans were offered positions mostly 
within the bounds of the British Empire in India, Africa, the Middle East and the 
Pacific. Congregationalists were directed to the Australian agents of the London 
Missionary Society to work in India, China, and the Pacific – also the regions in which 
the Baptist Foreign Mission Society operated. The Presbyterian Church had mission 
placements available in the New Hebrides, India, and Korea, while the Australian 
Methodist Mission Board operated in Fiji, Tonga, and New Guinea.63  
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The Student Volunteer Movement was dissolved in Australia in 1920, due to declining 
enthusiasm from graduates after World War One and an increased emphasis on 
building indigenous churches.64 Nonetheless, this was not a sign that the ASCM was 
turning inwards. As early as 1923, the ASCM leadership was encouraging its branches 
to discuss controversial topics, including the White Australia Policy, the League of 
Nations, the place of Mandated Territories in the world, and the treatment of 
indigenous Australians.65 The ASCM played an instrumental role in establishing 
politically-oriented clubs at Australian universities as well, occasionally in the face of 
opposition from university administrations. The first political clubs that they formed 
were ‘Public Questions’ societies at the Universities of Melbourne and Sydney, 
followed by Labour Clubs and League of Nations Unions.66 These clubs were a vehicle 
through which these student activists could meet and discuss issues related to 
economic and political power, peace, and the international order.  
 
The ASCM began to move out of the university during the Great Depression by 
promoting housing reform and direct action on social issues. Internally, it was also 
experiencing a greater polarisation in political discussions. The ASCM of the 1930s 
grappled with the effects of the Great Depression and an emerging radical social 
critique heavily influenced by Marxism as well as liberal Christianity. The ASCM chair 
in 1930 argued that ‘to avoid revolution, the Christian Church must be progressive, 
no longer bolstering up the unrighteous society of the past’.67 This belief in action and 
the positive role of state intervention to alleviate suffering was cemented in 1938 
with the publication of The Christian – the Light of the State, in which the ASCM 
affirmed that ‘as members of the State we can care for the sick and needy, educate the 
ignorant, and spread culture. We can abolish the robber instead of acting as Good 
Samaritan’.68   
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With the advent of World War Two, the ASCM saw its ranks quickly depleted and its 
structures curtailed; the 1941 conference was the last time an interstate meeting 
could be held until after the war. While some members received conscientious 
objection status, many joined the war effort. Wartime restrictions might otherwise 
have represented a significant blow to the organisation, but instead the war 
presented new opportunities for those who shared a belief in state intervention for 
the public good. The rapid expansion of the Commonwealth bureaucracy saw a 
network of ASCM graduates placed in policy-making positions, especially in the 
Departments of the Attorney-General and External Affairs.69   
 
As the war ended and the post-war world order was being formed, these former 
ASCM men – John Burton, Kenneth Bailey, William Macmahon Ball, and the Minister 
for External Affairs, H. V. Evatt – were all instrumental in developing Australia’s 
response, emphasising a commitment to international arbitration, the United Nations, 
and an international accord to protect human rights. Macmahon Ball, a Professor of 
Politics at the University of Melbourne, served as goodwill ambassador to Indonesia 
and the Dutch East Indies during the first years of the war of independence, and 
advocated support for the new nationalist regimes in Asia.70  
 
On campuses, the ASCM experienced a renaissance with the lifting of wartime 
restrictions and the flood of ex-servicemen into universities. The first national 
conference for the ASCM was held in 1946, at which the official study book 
envisioned the role of the church as embodying ‘an ideal worldwide community 
beyond congregations, denominations and nations, grounded in God and man and 
overcoming social and economic inequality’.71 The ASCM found its model of 
reformism challenged by a resurgent pro-communist left on campus, and ASCM 
activists became heavily involved in contests for control of student organisations in 
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Melbourne and Sydney. At the University of Melbourne, which was a focal point for 
activism and conflict between communist and non-communist groups, ASCM 
members Herb Feith and Betty Evans were instrumental in forming an ALP Club in 
direct opposition to the pro-communist Labour Club.72  
 
Internationally, churches were finding that older modes of mission work were under 
threat in a decolonising world. In India, missionary families were informed that their 
visas would not be renewed, while missionary work in mainland China was all but 
ended when the communists swept to victory.73 As the post-war global order of 
decolonisation and insurgent nationalism increasingly disrupted established 
humanitarianism, new ideas for aid were articulated, which would match programs 
of action to the unfolding challenge of the 1950s.   
 
Feith and the concept of ‘embedded’ technical assistance 
One such idea, that of ‘embedded’ technical assistance, found a receptive audience 
among ASCM activists at the University of Melbourne when it was articulated by 
returning delegates from an international conference. The first seeds were planted by 
delegates returning from the World University Service Assembly in Mumbai 
(Bombay). This Assembly had been marked by the debate on the future of ‘student 
relief’.  The issue at hand was what focus the organisation would have in the light of 
the scaling down of war-related relief efforts. The debate was between ‘cold charity’ – 
the supply of material goods for impoverished communities – and technical 
assistance. John Bayly, one of two Australian delegates and a student at the University 
of Melbourne, was approached by an Indonesian delegate, A.B. Loebis, who suggested 
a program of technical assistance that ‘embedded’ technical advisors in developing 
countries.74 Loebis argued that the issue for international aid was not just one of 
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understanding problems, but of identifying with the communities that advisors were 
assisting. Upon his return to Melbourne, Bayly relayed these ideas to the student 
organisations that had sponsored his trip, and a committee was formed to explore the 
idea, with Herb Feith taking a leading position.75  
 
Herb Feith brought to the project his own beliefs, shaped by personal experience. 
Born in Austria in 1930, Feith and his immediate family arrived in Australia in the 
late 1930s as refugees, the victims of persecution in Austria for their Jewish identity, 
and settled in Melbourne. Like much of the population of ‘Red’ Vienna, the Feiths 
were socialists and politically engaged.76 Feith enrolled at the University of 
Melbourne in 1948, and became heavily involved in the Methodist church and the 
ASCM.77 It was at the University of Melbourne that Feith studied the emerging Asian 
nationalist movements. This interest in Asia was nurtured by Macmahon Ball, who 
had travelled extensively in Asia as a representative for the Australian Government.78  
 
Feith’s intervention in propelling forward this idea of embedded development 
assistance was important for a combination of reasons. Born into a minority 
community in Austria and arriving in Australia as an outsider, Feith had come to 
identify strongly with Australian society and its professed egalitarianism. The idea of 
coming to understand and embrace a foreign culture was not idealistic for someone 
from Feith’s background: it was lived experience. From the perspectives of a migrant 
with a non-British background, he could also see shortcomings. Feith’s faith and 
politics also placed him in a rarefied position, as they developed in tandem. A socialist 
upbringing developed into activism in the Australian Labor Party, while his 
conversion to Methodism was tied to participation in the ASCM, an organisation 
whose emphasis on understanding current affairs and practical action to help the 
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poor and dispossessed he admired. His education under the guidance of William 
Macmahon Ball provided a background in Asian, and especially Indonesian, politics 
and culture that was without peer in Australia at the time.  
 
The idea of a graduate employment scheme to support the Indonesian republic was 
endorsed by the national conference of NUAUS in early 1951, after months of 
preparation and lobbying. With this formal endorsement, the Scheme came into 
existence. Many of the delegates registered interest in participating – although it 
would be several years before both the Indonesian and the Australian Government 
endorsed the Scheme as well. This chapter has laid out the background to the 
creation of the Scheme, and the particularly influential strands of thought, activism, 
and individual experience that saw the idea of a student-run, anti-racist aid 
organisation change from idealistic concept to realistic proposal. Perhaps the most 
visible element is the individuals who founded the Scheme, but they are situated 
within a broader community and history. Alongside these personal experiences and 
actions, the ASCM provided a national infrastructure, intellectual discourses, and 
networks of influential individuals that in turn shaped the structure and scope of the 
VGS. Underlying both these factors were the deeper strands of the interactions 
between Australian residents and the people of Indonesia. Drawing on the sense of 
unrealised potential in the relationships between the two societies, and thanks to the 
disruptions in interactions caused by World War Two, a perfect historical 
conjuncture arose in which the VGS could be established. It would not be a slave to 
these historical drivers. As the next chapter shows, the VGS quickly developed its own 
rhythms alongside the changing nature of Australian-Indonesian relations during the 





2.  The Volunteer Graduate Scheme and Australian-Indonesian 
Relations. 
When the VGS was approved by student activists in 1950, there were high hopes but 
few real-world models to which they could turn for inspiration. By 1962, the idea of 
embedded technical assistance was in good standing in Australia and internationally, 
but the Scheme which had demonstrated the potential of this model was nearing its 
end. This chapter focuses on three areas: the historical progression of the VGS from 
its rise to its end, understanding the composition of the Scheme, and weighing the 
idea of a ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-culture of worldmindedness’ pursuing 
Australian-Indonesian relations against the evidence drawn from the VGS. Underlying 
this focus is a reconsideration of the place that the VGS holds in the historiography of 
Australian-Indonesian relations.  
 
To date, prominence has often been given to diplomatic aspects of the history of 
those relations, as exemplified by the approach adopted by Bob Catley and Vinsensio 
Dugis' Australian–Indonesian Relations since 1945: the Garuda and the Kangaroo.79 
Influenced by the policy of 'Asian Engagement' and the 'Asian Nation' politics of the 
early 1990s, works such as these  focused on the handling of diplomatic crises that 
had arisen since Indonesian independence – with the implicit aim of supporting 
further engagement and understanding amongst Australians of their own place 
within Southeast Asia. The Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, with a similar goal, has commissioned several works on the relationship 
between Australia and Indonesia.80 
 
Nevertheless, whereas the focus in the established historiography rests largely with 
diplomatic crises and formal interactions between the Australian and Indonesian 
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Governments, the story of the VGS provides a different and alternative perspective:  
the important role of ‘world minded’ non-experts in creating an informal and semi-
formal mode of interacting with Indonesian society. 
 
Alongside the formal aspects of Australian-Indonesian relations, these informal and 
semi-formal modes of interaction have gone on to be a key part of the myth-making 
of Australian society’s engagement with post-colonial Asia. As early as 1956, it was 
expected that the VGS would have an outsized impact: the Indonesian Ambassador to 
Australia, Tirtawinata, told the 1956 national conference convened by the VGS that 
‘the smallest pebble thrown into a great sheet of water, causes ripples which 
eventually reach every shore. In the same way, the knowledge of this graduate 
scheme, the magnificent idealism behind it, is penetrating into the knowledge of 
people throughout the whole of Indonesia’.81 This sentiment, or something similar to 
it, continues to affect the way in which the VGS is integrated into historical 
understandings of Australian-Indonesian relations.     
 
There are three distinct phases in the Scheme’s history that will be considered in turn 
in this chapter: 1950-1953, 1953-1960, and 1960 onwards. During the first phase of 
the Scheme’s existence, the priority was making this type of aid program achievable – 
by making it both legible for the machinery of government and legitimate in the eyes 
of policy makers. The second period, in which legitimacy had been granted, involved 
the use of semi-formal and informal interactions to promote the project in the face of 
an unstable political situation in Indonesia and an increasingly sceptical Australian 
public. The final period saw a review of the Scheme’s ideals, and the amalgamating of 
the VGS into a similarly-organised aid organisation that had no specific focus on 
Australian-Indonesian relations. This chronology reveals some of the distinct 
elements of the approach that the VGS took towards Australian-Indonesian relations 
over the course of its operations.   
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This chapter then turns its consideration to the composition of the Scheme. The VGS 
projected a sense of optimism and idealism, and this section is intended to outline 
some of the characteristics of the VGS as it was, rather than as it claimed to be. The 
division of the volunteer cohort by gender, qualifications, length of service, and 
where they were posted in Indonesia provides for a more complete picture of the 
experience of the VGS.  
 
This background provides the background necessary to consider the idea put 
forward by Feith that he was part of a ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-culture of 
worldmindedness and political renewal’, and challenges whether this is an accurate 
representation of the character of the VGS. It shows that the VGS was not exclusively 
a project of the political left – nor did it draw its strength from the left. Instead, the 
VGS took in a diverse array of enthusiasts. This section shows that rather than being 
seen as an allied project, support for the VGS was noticeably absent from trade 
unions and civil society groups on the left. 
 
The Chronology of the VGS 
1950 - 1953 
The period from 1950 – 1953 was marked by the need to legitimise the program, 
make it comprehensible to both governments, and secure a functioning structure for 
the Scheme under which it could operate.  The Australian delegate to the World 
University Service conference in Bombay, John Bayly, returned to Melbourne in late 
1950. By January 1951, a committee had been formed and a proposal put to the 
annual conference of NUAUS to sponsor a program for the employment of graduate 
students in Indonesia as embedded technical experts for the new republic. This 
proposal was approved, and a sub-committee formed under the auspices of NUAUS to 
further the project. Seven conference delegates also expressed interest in taking part 
in the program. A flurry of letters was sent to Australian and Indonesian government 
officials, Labor politicians, and old ASCM supporters like Professor Macmahon Ball, 
introducing the Scheme. The Department of External Affairs, according to the first 
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progress report from the Scheme’s advocates, was ‘enthusiastic, but non-committal 
so-far’.82  
 
This opened the way for Herb Feith, who was due to depart for Jakarta in July 1951, 
to act as a test case for the Scheme. Feith had already found work in Indonesia with 
the help of Molly Bondan and her husband Mohammed Bondan, both of whom 
worked in the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry. By November 1951, a second 
volunteer, Gwenda Rodda, had been approved by the Indonesian Ministry of Health 
and negotiations were underway for Ollie McMichael, a radio engineer, to take up a 
position at the Air Training School in Jakarta. These first volunteers were not 
recognised by the Australian Government, and negotiations with the Department of 
External Affairs revolved around a failure to comprehend the distinct purpose of the 
Scheme as a project for intercultural exchange.83 As a consequence, the Australian 
Government initially declined to offer any support for the program, as it failed to see 
the distinction between it and the Colombo Plan that was then being established. A 
letter from Richard Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, to NUAUS, stated that ‘in 
light of existing Australian commitments under the Colombo Plan and the United 
Nations Programme of Technical Assistance, I consider that we would not be justified 
in giving financial assistance to a spearate [sic] scheme. Apart from the question of 
financial responsibility the operation of a scheme of the type proposed by Miss Evans 
is not free of practical difficulties’.84 
 
Negotiations to secure government backing for the project proceeded through 1952, 
leading to an agreement in November which outlined the Australian Government’s 
perspective on the Scheme. This was aided immensely by public advocacy for the 
VGS, which swayed members of the Australian Government to back the proposal: 
Menzies was said to be impressed by a presentation Don Anderson gave to an ASCM 
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conference which he attended.85 The details of this agreement were set out in a letter 
from the Department to Don Anderson, the Chair of the NUAUS committee on 
graduate employment in Indonesia. In this letter, six points of agreement were 
established, the most significant of which mandated that the Australian Government 
bear some of the costs for the Scheme but also gave the government final say on 
which applicants were approved.86  
 
A follow up meeting in Canberra between representatives of the Department of 
External Affairs and representatives of the Scheme fleshed out the Department’s view 
further. They would not recognise NUAUS or its role in the project, on the basis that 
this would become a ‘political’ question of the government playing favourites with 
non-governmental organisations. The Department did, however, recognise that the 
Scheme would require significant interaction, both formally and informally, with the 
Indonesian Government. The Department stated that, while it could have no ‘official 
knowledge’ of direct contact between the Indonesian Government and the Scheme, it 
was happy to allow it continue. The procedure for application was then agreed in 
summary, including an interview with staff from the Department. Aside from 
scrutinising qualifications, it was decided that applicants would be assessed on 
‘temperament’ and ‘zeal’. According to the minutes of the meeting, it was felt that ‘the 
main things are for candidates to have a realistic view of the situation to which they 
will be going, to be stable and balanced in outlook and yet at the same time to possess 
an enthusiasm and a missionary zeal’.87 
 
The success of the negotiators in securing Departmental support for the Scheme 
spurred the development of more intensive operations. The previously ad hoc sub-
committee formed in 1951 which managed the VGS was given permanency overseen 
by a committee of NUAUS. New officer roles were created to manage aspects of the 
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Scheme, with Don Anderson appointed Chairman and Jim Webb appointed 
Secretary/Treasurer. Jim Webb would take responsibility for the Scheme through to 
its merger with the Overseas Service Bureau, and would also go on to be a key player 
in the formation of the Australian Council for International Development, an umbrella 
group for non-government international aid organisations.88 Webb, a loyal ASCM 
member as a student and holder of multiple officer positions on campus and in the 
national student organisation NUAUS, served as Secretary/Treasurer of the Scheme 
on a voluntary basis while working for the University of Melbourne in tutoring and 
student welfare. The restructure gave pride of place to the Melbourne-based 
committee, with corresponding committees interstate feeding information and 
applications to their Victorian counterpart while a Jakarta-based committee of active 
volunteers would screen applicants and usher applicants through the Indonesian side 
of the process.89 
 
By 1953 the Scheme was functional. It had received the support of the Indonesian 
and the Australian Governments, although L.J. Arnott from the Department of 
External Affairs admitted that he ‘looked cross-eyed’ when he was first informed of 
the idea.90 The Australian Government financed and compartmentalised the Scheme 
under the Colombo Plan, which made it comprehensible to its policy-makers. Funding 
was available from the Australian Government for up to ten graduates to be sent to 
Indonesia every year. For the organisation of the Scheme itself, the committee in 
Melbourne established processes and managed applications in Australia, while 
Jakarta was home to three participants who relayed information and vetted 
candidates.  
 
The first period was driven by the intent to open up Australian-Indonesian relations, 
and establish intercultural ties on the basis of personal friendship rather than formal 
diplomacy. The Australian Government, warily, gave its approval to an informal and 
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semi-formal mode of interaction in which the participants – unlike a diplomat or 
foreign expert – would be left to represent Australia without external supervision 
and with only limited support. As a mode of interaction this was unproven, but as the 
Scheme transitioned into a new period of confidence and recognition, it appeared to 
have a secure and bright future.   
 
1953-1960 
1953 saw the beginning of the ‘golden age’ of the Scheme, in which the Volunteer 
Graduates Association was formed as a distinct entity to manage and promote the 
program. With its legitimacy established, the concept proven, and a new organisation, 
the years that followed were full of promise.  During 1954/1955, the VGS sent twelve 
volunteers to Indonesia. While not close to meeting initial expectations, this was 
encouraging for the individuals who had organised the VGS with no precedents to 
guide them.  Indeed, the following year, 1956, can be seen as the high point of the 
Scheme. Nine volunteers were in Indonesia on a range of projects, the only time that 
the number of participants came close to expectations. The Scheme received 
numerous requests for volunteers from different ministries in Indonesia, signalling to 
those who were running the Scheme that there was a place for this kind of program. 
1956 also saw the first national conference dedicated to the Scheme where the 
Indonesian Ambassador, Dr Tirtawinata, gave an enthusiastic keynote address. 
Opening his speech with the observation that ‘nothing which has been done to help 
my country in the eleven years since we gained our independence has so appealed to 
the hearts and minds of my countrymen as the graduate employment scheme’, he 
observed that the VGS ‘is a demonstration of goodwill and understanding which has 
moved our hearts greatly and which we feel can do more than all the speeches of 
people in high positions to cement friendly relations between our two nations’.91 
 
                                                                    
91 Speech delivered by Ambassador for Indonesia, to the Volunteer Graduate Scheme Conference at the 
Melbourne University, 23.08.1956, “VGS Papers”, item 21. 
39 
 
This confidence in the Scheme manifested itself in the formation of the Volunteer 
Graduates Association, which replaced the NUAUS standing committee. This made 
the Scheme essentially self-managing and independent of NUAUS, although NUAUS 
was still represented on the managing committee of the new association and the 
Scheme continued to advertise itself as sponsored by NUAUS. This Association 
allowed returned volunteers to continue contributing to the program, as well as 
providing a way that friends of the Scheme, often family members of volunteers, 
could be recognised and have a say in its administration. A new constitution was 
adopted, and it was decided that a quarterly journal for the Scheme would be 
distributed to the association’s members, student organisations, and individual 
subscribers. The journal Djembatan (‘The Bridge’) shared articles by volunteers and 
former volunteers on their experiences in Indonesia and the value of engaging with 
Indonesians on a person-to-person basis, and continued to act as a mouthpiece for 
the Scheme until its end. Djembatan spurred the expansion of the role of the VGS in 
Australian-Indonesian relations, to include advocating intercultural understanding 
within Australia. The VGS used its non-state, informal, and anecdotal understanding 
of Indonesian society – gained through informal and semi-formal interactions with 
Indonesians – to allay concerns about Indonesia and challenge ignorance. Quite 
effectively, returned volunteers became central players in discussions of the 
Indonesian state and progress in Australian-Indonesian relations: for example, an 
organisation as (presumably) isolated and parochial as the Horsham Methodist Guild 
in rural Victoria could host locally-born volunteer Gwenda Rodda to speak to them 
about Indonesia.92 
 
Yet even during the period when the Scheme seemed to be meeting the expectations 
that had been placed on it, it was not isolated from the changing political situation in 
Indonesia. Rather, the Scheme interacted dynamically with the changing political 
scene as participants found themselves in the position of being both outside 
observers of the crisis in constitutional democracy in Indonesia and surrogates for 
Indonesian nationalism in Australia. The 1955 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in 
Bandung boosted Sukarno’s prestige and made Indonesian nationalism a leading 
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voice for decolonisation and national liberation globally.  Internally, however, 
fractures in the Indonesian body politic and society were beginning to create 
significant problems. Indonesia had not held elections post-independence, with seats 
distributed via negotiation between different parties, interest groups, and 
individuals. Preparations for the election of a representative parliament and 
constitutional assembly were significantly delayed, but were finally held in 1955 – 
with high hopes for a clear political direction for a country that was judged to have 
suffered since independence from a confusion of parties and a lack of consistent 
political initiatives.   
 
As it turned out, the 1955 elections resulted in a parliament fairly equally divided 
between four mutually antagonistic major parties and a plethora of smaller parties 
and fronts, with virtually no chance for stable government.93 It also saw the collapse 
of the pro-Western Socialist Party and a huge increase in the vote for the Communist 
Party, stoking concern in Australia that Indonesia would ‘go red’.94 As the instability 
continued, military leaders asserted that they deserved a greater role in society, 
while Sukarno increasingly objected to the figurehead status afforded to the 
President and urged a return to revolutionary passion and the illiberal 1945 iteration 
of the Indonesian constitution. 
 
The tone of articles in Djembatan reflected this political instability, but sought to allay 
concerns about the safety of Indonesia and the strength of Indonesian civil society. 
The first edition of Djembatan came out shortly after the outbreak of the Permesta 
rebellion in March 1957. A Central Intelligence Agency supported military uprising in 
the eastern islands of Indonesia against the central government, the rebellion was 
widely reported in the Australian press. The foreword to the first edition of 
Djembatan advised readers that:  
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You will probably find that our point of view is somewhat different from that expressed 
in the daily press and very different from those expressed by Europeans who lived in 
Indonesia ten years ago or earlier… Our point of view starts from the basic assumption 
that all men are equal, and that no one is more equal than anyone else. Apart from that 
basic assumption, you will find that we have many points of view – obtained by looking 
around us, not by looking down.95 
In an article written for this same first edition on the Indonesian political scene and 
dated 20 June 1957, Herb Feith surveyed the way that politics had developed since 
the beginning of the Permesta rebellion. He wrote that, from a personal perspective, 
life continued as normal. He assured the parents of volunteers that there was no need 
for an Australian to worry about their safety. ‘If your letters from Indonesia are 
delayed’, Feith wrote, ‘don’t worry. It won’t be because anyone is afraid to write or 
because communications have been cut or anything like that. Almost certainly it will 
just be another case of administrative muck-ups’.96  
 
Five more volunteers were sent over in 1958, a significant decline from the 1956 
peak, but the Scheme continued to promote itself and stake a claim in the public 
consciousness on Australian campuses. The Scheme received a boost in its publicity 
in 1959 when UNESCO agreed to fund a special edition of Djembatan, which was 
distributed globally.97 While the Scheme was being lauded internationally, however, 
there were signs that it had already reached its peak. Primarily, the VGS was failing in 
its core task of delivering volunteers to work in Indonesia – thanks to bureaucratic 
inertia on the Indonesian side (see below), increasing concern for volunteer safety, 
and economic volatility.  
 
Yet by the end of the 1950s the Scheme had normalised the idea of embedded 
technical assistance, was well known in Australia and among influential groups 
abroad, and could rely upon a network of enthusiastic former and current volunteers 
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to support the project. Even by this stage, the small number of alumni were moving 
into prominence in cultural and academic fields: Ailsa Zainu’ddin was one of several 
volunteers who helped establish and subsequently guide the activities of the 
Australia Indonesia Association of Victoria, the most prolific of the Indonesia 
friendship associations in the 1950s and 1960s, while Herb Feith was offered a place 
with the Modern Indonesia Program at Cornell University in 1957.98 Upon the 
completion of his thesis in 1959, Dr. Kenneth Vern Bailey was already a respected 
expert on tropical disease and famine thanks to his experiences in the Scheme. Dr. 
Bailey would subsequently take up work with the World Health Organisation. It also 
offered a new path for Australian-Indonesian relations, outside of the diplomatic 
sphere and geared towards public consumption and public comprehension.   
 
1960 - 1963 
Despite these solid foundations, by 1960 the failure of the Scheme to live up to 
expectations – in volunteer numbers and impact – was being openly discussed. The 
changed political climate in Indonesia, where President Sukarno had assumed 
authoritarian power in 1959 through the implementation of his concept of ‘Guided 
Democracy’, was a deterrent to individuals wanting to work in Indonesia, but far 
from the only one. Low-level conflict with the newly created and pro-Western 
Malaysia, which counted Australia among its allies, and power struggles in a four-
sided contest between Sukarno, parliamentary forces opposed to dictatorship, the 
Army, and the Communist Party created a sense of crisis in Indonesia which was 
relayed to Australia through an often-hostile press.99 For the VGS, the more pressing 
issue was runaway inflation. The principle that Australians living and working in 
Indonesia should do so on a basis of complete equality with their local counterparts 
was difficult to sustain when Indonesian living standards were falling precipitously. 
This was keenly felt as inflation meant that the real wages of the majority of civil 
servants were no longer above poverty levels.100 
                                                                    
98 Purdey, From Vienna, 195. 
99 The editorial lines pursued by Australian newspapers towards Indonesian affairs is detailed in 
Viviani, “Australian Attitudes,” 63–79. 




Despite optimism that the Scheme would expand again and despite moves to increase 
publicity on campuses, the number of volunteers never returned to its 1956 peak.  
This was not from a lack of enthusiasm at the Australian end, where applications 
continued – albeit at a slower pace. The main problem was in Indonesia, where 
applications were not being acted upon, for both innocent and suspect reasons.101 
Moreover, the dearth of volunteers on the ground in Jakarta to tackle bureaucratic 
inertia and the fading good will towards Australians meant that the VGS, despite its 
best efforts, was unable to place applicants.  
 
An extended drought in volunteers of over a year was broken in May 1960, when 
economics graduate Lance Castles, who would co-write a book on Indonesian 
political thinking with Herb Feith in 1970, began his service. At the same time, some 
volunteers in health and medicine were arguing that the acute shortage of trained 
personnel in post-independence Indonesia was no longer apparent, and that the VGS 
may cause more harm than good by putting trained Indonesians out of work in some 
fields.  
 
The National Committee decided to send a questionnaire out to all the volunteers, 
past and present, asking them their thoughts on the Scheme and whether it was still 
valuable. It also questioned whether the commitment to complete equality of wages 
was still viable or desirable. Only one respondent of 23 emphatically supported the 
introduction of an extra salary allowance for volunteers, all others either felt that it 
would be unnecessary or that it was against the principles of the organisation. One 
respondent dismissed the idea of ending equal pay, writing that ‘the whole Scheme 
would lose its point and uniqueness if this expression of our aim had to be dropped. 
Then we might as well direct enquirers to the foreign aid schemes and be done with 
                                                                    
101 J. Gare to H. Feith, 23.05.1958, “VGS Papers”, item 35. This letter reveals some of the issues involved 
in handling the Indonesian bureaucracy - it was several months before the volunteers discovered that 




it’.102 The majority of respondents also rejected the idea that the Scheme had made all 
the contributions that it could. Instead, the deterioration of relations between 
Indonesia and the West was seen as an important indicator of the continued value of 
the Scheme. Castles himself – at times the only volunteer left in Indonesia in the early 
1960s – was emphatic that ‘it’s not yet time for us to think of withdrawing. There is 
no need to pull out now. If the V.G.S. could ever have achieved anything, it still can, 
and its need to do so is probably greater than ever’.103   
 
It was not to be. The Scheme lost its distinctive administration in 1963, when 
Australian Government funding allowed Jim Webb, whose efforts had previously 
been divided between paid employment and volunteer work with the VGS, to work as 
the full-time director of the Overseas Service Bureau. This organisation had the same 
ethos of supporting embedded technical assistance, without the specific focus on 
helping Indonesia. The National Committee of the Volunteer Graduates Association 
accepted the offer for the Overseas Service Bureau to administer volunteering in 
Indonesia, which continued up to the twenty-first century through Australian 
Volunteering International.104 
 
The Composition of the Scheme 
While the above history of the functioning of the Scheme provides valuable 
information on how the Scheme operated, it does not provide a complete 
understanding of the size and scope of the Scheme. Nor does it do justice to the ways 
in which the VGS represents a distinct mode of Australian-Indonesian relations. Due 
to the idealistic nature of the Scheme, much of the material that it produced presents 
a somewhat grandiose version of the program that may not reflect reality. This 
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103 Quoted in Feith, “An Episode,” 27. 
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section will look at some of the finer details of the Scheme and provide some of the 
statistics that are known about the Scheme, to present a more rounded picture. 
 
Betty Feith provides a list of 41 Australian volunteers as an appendix to An Episode in 
Education. This list appears to have been created from the honour roll of those who 
were considered ‘official’ volunteers under the Scheme found in issues of Djembatan, 
which began publication in 1957.105 Apart from the names of volunteers active in 
Indonesia, this honour roll included their degrees, the jobs that they were 
undertaking while there, and the locations of their posts.106 While 41 seems a low 
figure, which failed to come close to the expected number of volunteers, it represents 
the end result of a complex process of filtering which makes this number 
understandable – and suggests that numbers alone are not the key to understanding 
the significance of the VGS. The Melbourne-based committee for the Scheme, under 
its various guises (sub-committee, standing committee of NUAUS, National 
Committee of the Volunteer Graduates Association) managed all applications nation-
wide, with input from a Jakarta-based committee and, when the number and 
dispersal of volunteers made this impractical, through active volunteers on an ad hoc 
basis. The activists in the Scheme – ex-volunteers, Committee members, and other 
enthusiasts – drew up lists of potential recruits to approach about participating in the 
Scheme. Interstate committees of two or three students or faculty were tasked with 
identifying potential recruits on their own campuses. In 1956, Jim Webb submitted a 
report to the Executive of NUAUS in which he noted that for every 15 to 20 enquirers 
‘who pursue the matter in any detail’, only one ever goes to Indonesia. Webb also 
noted that the VGS Committee was normally in contact with prospective volunteers 
for 12 to 18 months before their departure for Indonesia.107 
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Of those who successfully passed through this filtering process and became a 
volunteer, there are several distinguishing characteristics that reflect upon the 
Scheme as a whole. Firstly, the gender balance present in the VGS – 25 men were 
participants compared to 16 women – was both noteworthy and something that fits 
with the culture of the ASCM, an organisation which historically supported active 
female participation at all levels. This included both married and unmarried women, 
which was considered problematic and will be discussed further in Chapter four. 
Secondly, the background of the participants was heavily skewed towards 
Melbourne. Twenty-five of the volunteers held degrees from the University of 
Melbourne, while the next largest source of volunteers was the University of Sydney 
with a mere five. Armidale, the Universities of Adelaide, Queensland, and Tasmania 
all provided two volunteers, while the Universities of Western Australia and New 
South Wales produced one volunteer each. One volunteer, Adele Kerridge, held a sub-
degree qualification (a Diploma in Occupational Therapy), but participated in the 
Scheme alongside her husband, an Agricultural Science graduate from the University 
of Queensland. 
 
Thirdly, the volunteer experience of Indonesia was centred on Jakarta. Sixteen of the 
placements for volunteers were in Jakarta, while a further eleven were nearby in 
West Java. Sulawesi had four volunteers over the length of the Scheme whereas Aceh, 
Central Java, and East Java were home to three each. Two volunteers worked in 
Flores, and Sumatra and Kalimantan each had a volunteer. The kind of work that 
volunteers found themselves doing in Indonesia was diverse, but had a strong 
educational focus. The English Language Inspectorate of the Indonesian Ministry of 
Education seemed to be the most enthusiastic element of the Indonesian civil service 
about the Scheme. The Inspectorate employed the largest number of volunteers, 
despite the stated emphasis on technical and industrial aid: the Ministry of Education 
was described in the special edition of Djembatan as ‘our best “customer”’.108 Jim 
Webb’s report to the NUAUS Executive Meeting held in May, 1956, reported with 
pride that a formal request for ‘at least’ twenty volunteers to teach English in the 
                                                                    
108 “They Also Serve,” Djembatan, September 1959, 7. 
47 
 
Ministry of Education had been received.109 Elsewhere, the number of teaching 
positions that volunteers could potentially fill in a single year was estimated at 
upwards of sixty. Sixteen volunteers served as lecturers or researchers, with a further 
ten teaching English. Five worked in government administration as economists or 
office workers. Despite the need for doctors and engineers being a priority for the 
Indonesian Government, only three doctors and three engineers participated in the 
Scheme, with the remaining volunteers finding work as a botanist, pharmacist, 
occupational therapist, and librarian.   
 
In the agreement between the VGS administrators and the Department of External 
Affairs, it was envisaged that volunteers would be able to serve up to two terms in the 
Scheme, with each term being between two and three years.110 Most volunteers 
served the expected two or three years. Beyond the average, seven served for three 
years or more, while eight served two years or less. One volunteer abandoned the 
Scheme after only a few months and returned to Australia. Contrary to expectations, 
only four volunteers officially undertook more than one term of service, although 
several did undertake other work in Indonesia outside the Scheme while one, who 
married an Indonesian, was denied Australian Government approval to undertake a 
second term as an official volunteer.  One of the most significant impediments that 
the VGS encountered in recruiting graduates was the issue of teaching graduates 
being bonded to the state for a period of service after graduation. Several applications 
make it clear that otherwise qualified candidates could not undertake service in 
Indonesia due to outstanding commitments to state governments.111  
 
The VGS never realised its promise: the Scheme was a modest enterprise, sending 
fewer than 50 volunteers to Indonesia over more than a decade. An aggregate 
experience emerges from these volunteers that fits very well with that of Herb Feith: 
a Melbourne-based applicant, education-focused, more likely than not to be male, and 
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bound for Jakarta. This is not the sum total of the Scheme. As the next section will 
show, the experiences of Herb Feith, which have had such a significant influence on 
the way that the VGS has been remembered, are not universal. 
 
A ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-culture’ reconsidered 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, Herb Feith situated his life’s story in an 
‘Australian-Indonesian honeymoon’, driven by a ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-
culture of worldmindedness and political renewal’. This was an accurate description 
for Feith’s own ethos and background, but the picture is far less clear if we analyse 
his fellow volunteers. Instead, the diverse backgrounds of the participants in the 
Scheme, the way that the Scheme interacted with civil society groups within 
Australia, and the way that the state viewed and understood the Scheme all point 
towards a much broader engagement with ‘worldmindedness’ and Australian-
Indonesian relations.  
 
From its infancy, the Scheme was not an exclusive project of the left. John Bayly, as 
the delegate from the World University Service conference who brought the idea of 
‘embedded technical assistance’ to the students of Melbourne, is credited with 
originating the Scheme. But the second Australian delegate who took part in these 
early discussions, Alan Hunt, was at that time the President of the Melbourne 
University Liberals, and would go on to serve as Liberal Leader in the Victorian 
Legislative Council.112 The early volunteers continue this pattern of political diversity. 
Of three volunteers in Indonesia at one time, Herb Feith was a member of the 
Australian Labor Party, as was Harry Whitfield, who referred to himself in his 
application as a ‘convinced Socialist’.113 In comparison the third volunteer, Gwenda 
Rodda, was active in the conservative Country Party, where she had served as the 
Secretary of a youth branch, in the lead up to the defeat of Chifley’s Labor 
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administration.114  This is not unexpected for an organisation so deeply linked to the 
ASCM. While the ASCM had many Labor-supporting members, it was non-partisan 
and included members and supporters of parties of the centre and right. 
 
The way that the Scheme interacted with civil society groups in Australia similarly 
challenges the idea that this was a small, left-wing intellectual group. The most 
enthusiastic groups which supported the Scheme during its negotiations with the 
Australian Government were church organisations, including the leadership of 
several protestant denominations.115 These groups strongly favoured better relations 
between Australia and Indonesia, and were happy to use their considerable influence 
to bolster the Scheme when it was first being developed. However, the interest in the 
Scheme moved beyond the protestant Christian groups from which it arose: for 
example, the Catholic ‘Food for Peace’ group also supported the work that the 
Scheme was undertaking.116 Outside the metropolitan areas, the Country Women’s’ 
Association hosted volunteers to talk about their work in Indonesia and its 
importance to Australia.117  
 
The position of financial supporters also reveals that this ‘sub-culture’ was far more 
widespread than appears at the outset. Sir Kenneth Bailey, the Solicitor-General, had 
both intellectual and familial ties to the Scheme through his son Vern Bailey, and 
actively sought out potential benefactors on behalf of the VGS.118 Another supporter 
of the Scheme was the Australian High Commissioner in London, Sir Allen Brown, 
who donated twenty guineas sterling for the promotion of the Scheme.119 These men 
were part of the Australian political establishment, and the fact that their names can 
                                                                    
114 Rodda is listed as an organiser of the ominously (to modern, politically correct ears) themed 
‘Brightest Hawaii and Darkest Australia’ themed ball. “Young Country Party Ball,” The Horsham Times, 
November 26, 1948, 4. 
115 J. Garrett to R.G. Casey, 08.10.1951, “Recruitment of Experts - Indonesia - Volunteer Graduate 
Scheme”, A1838/2032/5/4 PART 1, NAA. 
116 J. Mackenzie to J. Webb, 09.08.1958, “VGS Papers”, item 3. 
117 G. Rodda to volunteers, 19.04.1955, “VGS Papers”, item 65. 
118 K.V. Bailey to J. Webb, 11.10.1958, “VGS Papers”, item 3. 
119 D. Anderson to A. Brown, 06.04.1959, “VGS Papers”, item 1. 
50 
 
be tied to the VGS shows that the ideas behind the Scheme were attractive outside the 
political sub-group of Labor supporting students in higher education  
  
One section of civil society that is absent in its support for or interaction with the 
Scheme is the trade union movement. While the Scheme did reach out to certain 
professional associations, this was on the basis of their status as professional groups 
for graduates, in keeping with the focus of the Scheme on individuals with particular 
qualifications.120 In a similar vein, the correspondence that the Scheme entered into 
with the Australian Student Labour Federation appears to have been a courtesy 
extended to all major organised groups on campus – such as the ASCM and the 
Catholic Newman Society – rather than an indicator of partisan sympathies.121 VGS 
volunteers were on hand to help the Labor-aligned Australian observers at the 1955 
Bandung Conference (ex-ASCM member and foreign affairs expert John Burton and 
ANU Professor C.P. Fitzgerald), but there is no indication from the correspondence 
between the volunteers in Indonesia and the administrators in Melbourne that this 
was anything but assisting their employers in the Indonesian Government.122 The 
only Labor Member of Parliament who seems to have taken any interest in the 
Scheme was Jim Cairns, who was also a founding member of the Australian-
Indonesian Association of Victoria and a well-known supporter of anti-colonial 
nationalisms abroad.123 Other Labor MPs were sceptical or outright dismissive of the 
endeavour. Leading Labor figure Kim Beazley Sr. dismissed the Scheme, finding it 
inconceivable that white Australians would be treated equally in Indonesia (let alone 
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want to go there), while Labor Leader Evatt withheld his support from the Scheme 
when he was approached.124  
 
Conclusion 
Judging from raw figures, the VGS appeared to be a failure. When it held its first 
national conference in 1956, the idealists who had worked so hard to establish the 
VGS could look forward to a bigger and brighter future for the Scheme. Instead, what 
was seen at the time as their project’s first steps would later be recognised by these 
same individuals as its apex. The Scheme never lived up to expectations, not least 
because of the perceived ‘instability’ of the Indonesian Republic and the vagaries of 
Indonesian politics. The VGS put forward an innovative mode for international 
relations in which the personal, the semi-formal, and the informal could be used to 
bolster cross-cultural understanding. In doing so it explicitly diverged from high 
politics, formal diplomacy, and the type of foreign technical assistance that 
perpetuated expatriate communities and the division between locals and outsiders. 
 
The significance of the Scheme was never intended to be measured solely by the 
number of volunteers that it sent to Indonesia, but by the impact that it was able to 
make on attitudes and culture. In this respect, the outcomes of the Scheme were 
mixed. Mutual distrust increased in both Indonesia and Australia, while the relations 
between Indonesia and Australia reached an all-time nadir during konfrontasi, just as 
the Scheme was being absorbed into the Overseas Service Bureau. However, in 
Australian society, former volunteers and activists played disproportionate roles in 
advocating for change in Australia’s restrictive immigration policies and in teaching 
Australians about Asia, because they had a means of directly accessing international 
relations normally restricted to diplomats or foreign experts. 
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As a model for embedded technical assistance, the United States Peace Corps and the 
British Voluntary Service Overseas both claimed descent from the VGS. The Scheme is 
very much a product of the political landscapes of Indonesia and Australia in the 
post-war years, and much can be learnt about these landscapes by looking in depth at 
aspects of the Scheme’s operations. Like other aspects of Australian-Indonesian 
relations, it is impossible to deny the impact of the Cold War and racial attitudes on 
the Scheme. The impact was profound but also more nuanced than it appears on its 




3.  The Cold War and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme. 
The Cold War is central to understanding much of global history in the decades after 
the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945. For many who lived through this period, it 
served as a framework through which major political events were understood and 
contextualised. More than this, its effect was profound in determining what was 
acceptable and how individuals related to each other and to institutions. These 
influences were not always obvious, even to those who experienced them firsthand, 
nor were these influences always clearly expressed.  As we shall see, the Cold War 
had particular resonances in Australia – resonances that were a good deal more 
profound and far-reaching than has sometimes been recognised.  
 
With respect to the VGS specifically, it is possible to argue – as Agnieszka Sobocinska 
has recently done – that the Cold War had ‘surprisingly little impact’.125 Such a 
position, however, is based on a narrow interpretation of what ‘impact’ means. A 
more robust approach is to assert the overall pervasiveness of the Cold War in the 
Australia and Indonesia of the 1950s and 1960s, and to recognise that those 
associated with the VGS could not escape it, even if they had wished. This broader 
view of the impact of the Cold War leads to a different conclusion: rather than having 
a limited impact, the Cold War is better understood as being woven into the very 
fabric of the Scheme through its effect on the people, the institutions, and the 
processes of the VGS – both in Australia and Indonesia.  
 
In Australia, the VGS scrutinised individuals who expressed interest in the Scheme for 
political and moral rectitude, adopting standards that they felt were shared with the 
conservative Menzies administration. What they may not have known is that the 
stridently anti-communist Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, was 
personally involved in the vetting of every person seeking departmental approval 
under the Scheme, and that the Minister placed high importance on maintaining the 
Scheme’s reputation as a representative of ‘Australian values’.  
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Two case studies from the selection process show the influence of the Cold War on 
the functioning of the Scheme in Australia. In the first, the experience of the applicant 
Kenneth Milne highlights the concern among those involved in the process that left-
wing political leanings could cruel someone’s chance to volunteer. In the second, two 
teachers, Allan and Wendy Scarfe, were rejected explicitly by the Minister on the 
grounds of their past connections to communism. Both cases demonstrate how the 
Scheme was shaped by the pressures towards Cold War conformity, rather than 
being immune to them.  
 
Moreover, the impact of the Cold War on the VGS was not limited to Australia. Once in 
the country they had pledged to serve, the volunteers could not stand aloof from the 
ongoing debates around communism, anti-communism, and development that they 
encountered. Instead, volunteers had to navigate the Cold War by thought and deed, 
gravitating naturally towards the elements of Indonesia’s political and social sphere 
that matched their own anti-communist and liberal-minded politics and taking a view 
towards development that was critically supportive of pro-Western reformers. In 
doing so, though, they were often fully aware of their own precarious position as 
outsiders in Indonesian society, and were circumspect proponents, if vocal at all, of 
their views. The larger question to be addressed here is whether the VGS should be 
considered to be part of an anti-communist, pro-Western apparatus active in Cold 
War Indonesia. In this respect, as will be argued, the case of Herb Feith himself is 
singularly revealing. But an aversion to communism and the radical left was not 
restricted to Feith alone. Rather, it was an institutional element of the VGS, which 
shaped the understanding of Indonesian society and politics that this generation 
gained through the Scheme. These perspectives subsequently shaped Australian 
academic and public discourses, in real but often unquantifiable ways. 
 
For Australia’s neighbours in Southeast Asia, of course, the ‘Cold’ War was anything 
but cold, with communist insurgencies throughout the region alongside multiple 
military interventions by Western powers. The Cold War had a Southeast Asian death 
toll in the many millions by the time of its putative conclusion with the fall of the 
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Berlin Wall in 1989. Recent research into the Cold War has concentrated on the role 
and function that the Cold War played on transnational history, influenced by the 
‘new’ or ‘post-revisionist’ schools of Cold War history and the debates they have 
spurred.126 This historiography, guided by the release of Soviet and American 
archives in the 1990s, has re-examined and brought to the fore the argument that the 
Cold War was centred in essence around the battle of ideas and beliefs.127 Odd Arne 
Westad, from the London School of Economics, suggested in the 2000 Bernath 
Lecture that the most fruitful areas for further investigation in the study of Cold War 
history will be around the paradigms of ‘ideology’, ‘technology’, and ‘the Third 
World’.128 Westad subsequently published The Global Cold War, which focused on the 
impact of these factors on the Cold War as a global struggle between two power 
blocs.129 
 
That the Cold War should have such deep implications, even in Australia, may seem 
counterintuitive. Communism was never more than a minor political movement in 
Australia. While it had enjoyed successes during World War Two, greatly expanding 
its membership and coming close to winning a majority at the 1945 congress of 
Australia’s major trade union federation, these successes were halted and turned 
back in the latter half of the 1940s.130 Although communists continued in leadership 
positions in many important trade unions, including those covering the mining and 
shipping industries, this never translated into significant political influence, signified 
best perhaps by the fact that the Menzies Government was only narrowly defeated in 
its attempt to ban the Communist Party of Australia via referendum in 1951.131 
Nevertheless, Australian political life in the 1950s was dominated by the perceived 
threat of communism, with the Petrov spy scandal fuelling claims of Soviet 
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infiltration of society. Known and suspected radicals were often under surveillance 
by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), which had been 
established specifically to fight the perceived internal threat posed by communist 
spies. Party members were banned from the civil service under Menzies, and many 
found difficulty in securing employment. Australia was firmly aligned with the United 
States in international affairs, and contributed soldiers to the Korean and Vietnam 
wars.132  
 
In Indonesia, meanwhile, communism was woven into the nation-building myths of 
Sukarno. The interconnectedness of decolonisation and the Cold War was highly 
visible in Southeast Asia, and as Albert Lau of the National University of Singapore 
has argued, ‘the dissolution of colonial empires in Southeast Asia became inextricably 
connected to the political and ideological challenges involved in the pursuit of the 
global Cold War’.133 For Sukarno and his acolytes, the future of Indonesia would be 
based on nasakom, an abbreviation of nationalism, religion, and communism. The 
Indonesian Communist Party was a mass-based party, the largest outside the China 
and the Soviet Union, with millions of supporters and allies in auxiliary groups such 
as the Peasants Front of Indonesia and the Indonesian Women’s Movement. 
Communists completely dominated the largest trade union federation, and as the 
1950s continued were spreading their influence in the so-called abangan 
communities of Java.134 This was of intense interest to the American Government: 
with a huge population, located on globally significant transport routes, and loaded 
with valuable resources, Indonesia was in many ways the most important domino in 
Southeast Asia.135 Within Lau’s historiographical analysis, Indonesia is best 
understood as part of a ‘lower arc’ of Southeast Asia, where aid and influence 
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peddling were the primary methods of waging the Cold War.136 While the hand of the 
Central Intelligence Agency was embarrassingly revealed in rebellions against the 
central Indonesian Government in the late 1950s, the American Government’s 
strategy revolved around the encouragement of anti-communist elements of the 
Indonesian armed forces. Though the conflict in Vietnam was increasingly prioritised 
as the 1960s progressed, Indonesia continued to be a key piece in American strategic 
thinking.137  
 
Delving even further, the nature of aid and economic development programs during 
the Cold War has been a matter of significant debate. This debate is one of obvious 
relevance to the history of the role of Westerners (including the VGS) in aid projects 
in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s, and to discussion of the volunteers as vectors 
for certain Western ideas and beliefs.138 The Colombo Plan is the only Australian Cold 
War aid program that has received any significant analysis. Analysis of it by Daniel 
Oakman places the program of development support for Asian nations firmly within 
the context of the Cold War. Australia’s contribution to the Colombo Plan was 
designed explicitly as an ‘instrument of Australia’s foreign policy fight against 
communism’.139 
 
In the case of Indonesia as a recipient nation-state, the study of the role of aid during 
the Cold War has been relatively limited, despite acknowledgement of its 
importance.140 While Soviet aid to Indonesia has recently received some attention, 
focus has remained fixed on the role of Western aid to Indonesia and the role that this 
aid played in consolidating the army-backed ‘New Order’ regime, headed by General 
Suharto. The New Order regime came to power in Indonesia in an ‘incremental coup’ 
between 1965 and 1967, a process which saw the replacement of Sukarno as head of 
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state and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, hitherto the army’s 
main rivals for power. The narrative of aid as a tool of anti-communist intervention 
was first popularised by David Ransom’s exposé of the part played by Ford 
Foundation specialists in securing a Western-oriented development plan for 
Suharto’s Indonesia, originally in the press of the New Left.141 More recently this has 
been greatly expanded by International Studies scholar Inderjeet Parmar, of the 
University of London, from an academically more rigorous perspective.142  
 
The role of these ‘economists with guns’ in the authoritarian development strategies 
of Cold War Indonesia are an important historical subject, which fit into a broader 
narrative of American foreign interventions in support of capitalism.143 However, the 
emphasis on securing American interests has not kept pace with new 
historiographies, encouraged by Westad, which look at the role of ideas and beliefs. 
Westad notes that there has been a wariness in ascribing ideological motivation to 
‘the West’, and further analysis of the place of non-governmental aid and aid workers 
illuminates some of the under-researched elements of what was a complex ecology of 
interactions between Indonesia and the West.144  
 
The Cold War and the VGS in an Australian context 
As an organisation that crossed borders, the VGS had to work within both theatres of 
the Cold War, which in turn shaped the Scheme throughout its existence. This process 
began, naturally enough, in the local Australian context from which the VGS arose. 
From its origins, the VGS was marked by the Cold War-inflected disputes among 
Australian university students of the post-war years. At the micro-level, many 
individuals involved in administering the Scheme participated in political activities as 
students. Some of the more forthrightly partisan activities included challenging 
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communist stewardship of student representative councils and forming breakaway, 
pro-Labor ALP Clubs on campuses where established Labour Clubs were under the 
control of the Communist Party or their fellow-travellers.145 A worldview hostile to 
communism and critical of Communist Party tactics was an unspoken element of the 
process of political maturation for these student activists of the late 1940s and early 
1950s. This was not necessarily a reflexive or virulent anti-communism, but more 
often an engagement in the battle of ideas. This alone could be dangerous in an 
atmosphere of suspicion. Feith was the subject of report to the conspiracy-minded 
Victorian Special Branch for his ‘pro-Communistic’ leanings, a claim that found its 
way into an ASIO file that was sporadically added to up to the late 1970s.146 But in 
writing home to family and close friends, shared interest in politics was important 
enough for Herb Feith to conclude one of his letters by celebrating the No result in 
the 1951 referendum, despite his own hostility to communism.147  
 
The political disputes of the Cold War were a normal, even casual, element of the 
shared lives of these student activists. Letters between the Scheme’s organisers 
mixed official business with political gossip, such as the ‘local ALP scandal’ involving 
ALP Club members from Melbourne University, who were undermined by anti-
communist Labor MPs while campaigning for a ‘No’ vote on the Communist Party 
Dissolution referendum.148 Many of the activists who would shepherd the Scheme for 
years to come, such as Feith and Webb, maintained an interest in this campus 
partisanship. With this background, it is unsurprising that the influence of the Cold 
War threaded through one of the fundamental activities of the Scheme in Australia: 
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The selection process 
At face value, the Scheme encouraged the participation of all who shared common 
values around opposition to the White Australia Policy and a belief that the 
Australian people had a positive role to play in Asian affairs. In none of the literature 
was there any stated requirement to meet any loyalty tests or to hold a particular 
worldview. On the contrary, the Scheme made efforts to reach out to a variety of 
political, religious and social groups then active on campuses.149 Despite this outreach 
to other organisations, it is clear from internal documents that there was a particular 
type of person who would be selected for the program: until the very end of the 
1950s, all volunteers had also been ASCM members.150  
 
The VGS National Committee was not the lone arbiter of the selection process. The 
Department of External Affairs made it clear that, if the Scheme was to have 
government support, the Department would have a continuing role in in the selection 
of candidates. In these discussions, the responsibility of the Scheme to screen 
applicants against a test was established. This test focused on ill-defined 
characteristics such as temperament, maturity, and stability, but as Webb reported to 
the rest of the committee:  
We must not think that E.A. approval is automatic. In general E.A. will accept 
Indonesian judgment on the technical qualifications and the utility of the candidate … 
but make no mistake, the Department could and would reject someone they felt to be 
unsuitable.151  
The report went on to state that rejections would be unlikely ‘if we do our job 
properly’.  
 
It is unclear from this report whether there was agreement between the VGS and the 
Department over whether a person with ties to communism, existing or former, 
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would pass this test. Alongside this lack of clarity, it was uncommon for politics to be 
explicitly raised by individuals in their application, which left the meaning of these 
specific requirements opaque. The silence around politics was not total, however, and 
in some instances the politically-charged atmosphere in which the Scheme 
functioned was exposed.  
 
Case Study: Kenneth Milne 
In September 1955, the Scheme’s chief administrator Jim Webb corresponded with 
representatives of the Scheme at the University of Western Australia, regarding the 
application of Kenneth Milne. A teacher in the process of completing a Bachelor of 
Arts at the University of Western Australia, Milne was an atypical applicant: originally 
from Scotland, Milne had attended university as a mature age entrant after several 
years as a merchant seaman.  
 
Milne made it clear in his application that he was one of those ‘White Australia 
cranks’ to which the Scheme was advertised. Where Milne was asked to identify his 
hobbies, activities, and past associations with Asian affairs, he declared that in the 
merchant service ‘I had charge of 24 Chinese firemen with whom I was on friendly 
and equal terms as far as the job permitted. The restrictions were not of my 
making’.152 With four years of teaching experience, including to non-English speaking 
‘New Australians’, and a commitment to anti-racism, Milne appeared to be a good 
candidate for the Scheme. However, the other documents from his application reveal 
politically-charged hesitation about his suitability to take part in the VGS. 
 
The letter of recommendation that he received from the Guidance and Appointments 
Officer at the University was impersonal, unsure of what qualities were desired, and 
prevaricating in its assessment. The university official wrote that ‘Milne is quiet and 
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reserved, is said to be an idealist, and one who is very conscious of the inequality of 
opportunity amongst the various races in the world’, before concluding: 
He impresses me as being a mature individual and I know of no evidence of emotional 
instability. I do not know what his political views are, or whether you are concerned 
with them. All I can say is that to my knowledge he does not play any part in the 
political activities at this University.153  
Ostensibly favourable, this report on Milne could be read ambiguously, and stopped 
well short of a whole-hearted endorsement.  
 
Subsequently an interview was conducted with Milne by a WA-based representative 
of the VGS. He reported back that Milne: 
appears to have no racial prejudices, is keen to learn Indonesian, speaks a little Dutch 
and is left-wing politically. He seemed a little worried lest the fact that he was for one 
year a member of the Labour Club should preclude him from selection. He assures me 
that he has had no political affiliations for 2 years. I am practically convinced (though I 
cannot be sure) that he is not the subversive, mischief-making type.154  
After this reassurance, Milne was approved by the National Committee. Webb 
produced a report on Milne that quoted Boyce’s letter and detailed all the 
correspondence that had occurred regarding his application, finishing with the 
encouragement that ‘his papers should go to Embassy within a fortnight to 3 weeks, 
unless my account of the difficulties scares him off, which it shouldn’t do!’155  
 
Nonetheless, something evidently happened to cool Milne’s enthusiasm.  We do not 
know if this was political or personal.  We do know, however, that Milne never 
followed through with his application. A letter – apparently unanswered – from Webb 
to Milne inquiring if he was still interested in the Scheme, dated 20 April 1956, is the 
last piece of correspondence on file. Even so, Milne’s application, when contextualised 
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by other applications, reveals several important elements how the VGS navigated the 
political atmosphere of the 1950s in its selection process.  
 
Firstly, the VGS approached the sensitive subject of political views and affiliations 
under the umbrella of ‘motivation’. This catch-all could be used to assess both the 
actions and the thought processes of potential volunteers, while only obliquely 
connected to politics. It was clear to the WA representative of the Scheme what kind 
of information was being sought: as well as needing to reassure the Scheme’s 
administrators that he did not hold racist views, Milne’s political views would also be 
subjected to their assessment. For Milne’s admittedly left-wing political views to be 
an acceptable motivation required them to be framed in a manner that emphasised 
his maturity and stability – something also done by other, successful, applicants. John 
Gare, who worked as an aeronautical engineer in Jakarta from 1957 to 1960, received 
a letter of recommendation from the Master of Wesley College at the University of 
Sydney. The letter stated, in part, that Gare ‘is not aggressive in his ideas and, from a 
number of discussions in which he has taken part with other students in my 
presence, I would say he has a well-balanced, sane outlook on the world which 
confronts him’.156   
 
Despite the circumspect approach of the Scheme, Milne as an applicant was aware 
that his politics would be subject to scrutiny. He chose to directly confront his 
problematic politics by distancing himself from his previous membership in the 
Labour Club and assuring the interviewer that he had not been politically active for 
several years. Other applicants made similar moves to reassure the administrators of 
the VGS that they were free from dubious political affiliations. Some are quite clear, 
such as the application of Neale Hunter, who wrote that he ‘had little to do with the 
active side of student affairs, having been quite content to follow their progress and 
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observe the results’.157 Others, like Ann McDonald, hedged their bets. McDonald wrote 
that as a student she was a member of both the Labour and the Liberal Clubs.158  
 
A popular method applicants used to remove uncertainty about their political 
trustworthiness, which Milne did not, was to stress their reliability and good standing 
in the community – and by doing so, emphasising their respect for the values that 
Menzies asserted as central to middle-class citizenship and the Australian ‘way of 
life’.159 The letter of recommendation written on behalf of Ann McDonald, who served 
as a volunteer in the English Language Inspectorate in Jakarta, is an explicit example 
of this emphasis on standing. The letter of recommendation reads, in part, that ‘She 
comes from a good Christian family which is highly respected in this City [Armidale]. 
Ann is a true reflection of a carefully studied upbringing and a happy home life’.160 
Political exclusion, though, was not a universal anxiety – if idealism was matched by 
activity. For example, Harold Whitfield, who would lecture at Gadja Mada University 
from 1954-1957, wrote in his application letter to the Indonesian Government that 
he was a ‘convinced Socialist’.161 While this may have been alarming, and 
disqualifying in what was a pervasively anti-communist atmosphere, Whitfield was 
an individual who could rely on his personal connections. He was known to members 
of the committee through his activities in the ASCM and the ALP Club at Melbourne 
University, and could assure public servants that his socialism was of an acceptably 
moderate and technocratic, rather than radical, type.  
 
While the internal dynamics of the VGS may have supported, however tentatively, a 
‘broad church’, this was not true of the Department of External Affairs. In fact, the 
reputational risk of sending the ‘wrong’ representatives led the Minister for External 
Affairs, Richard Casey, to claim that he personally vetted every appointment under 
the Scheme. In one case, the Minister stepped in and vetoed two applicants who had 
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been approved by both the VGS and the Indonesian Government. He defended this as 
the common-sense refusal to send self-confessed communist sympathisers, but he 
caused a minor controversy to erupt on Australian campuses around anti-
communism and the nature of academic freedom, with the VGS at its centre.  
 
Case Study: The Scarfes 
In many respects, husband and wife Allan and Wendy Scarfe were typical applicants 
to the VGS. The Scarfes possessed many of the characteristics of successful 
applicants: they lived and worked in Melbourne, where they had both studied at the 
University of Melbourne, held teaching qualifications, were from a Protestant 
background, and were in their mid-twenties. More than being typical, the Scarfes 
appeared to be ideal candidates for the Scheme. They were experienced teachers, yet 
were neither bonded to nor tenured in the school system. Furthermore, they were 
undertaking language instruction through the Indonesian Section of the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission, two of only ten in their class.162 As perhaps an ultimate 
advantage, the Scarfes were on friendly personal terms with staff from the 
Indonesian consulate in Melbourne. In addition to all this, the Scarfes applied at a 
time of significant expansion for the Scheme, when those willing and able to teach 
were in high demand. The head of the English Language Inspectorate in Indonesia 
had only recently requested many more teachers, while the administrators of the VGS 
were in the process of promoting the Scheme in teaching publications.163  
 
Allan Scarfe’s application reveals that the Scarfes were interested in working in Java 
teaching English either at a teachers’ college or secondary school.164 Allan Scarfe also 
mentioned their acquaintance with Djismoen, Head of the Economic Section of the 
Indonesian diplomatic corps in Australia, and his assistant Salim, ‘both of whom 
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indicated that we might mention their names, and if necessary they will vouch for our 
sincerity and our ability to make friendships with Indonesians’.165 Scarfe finished his 
application letter with the explanation of his and his wife’s motivation, writing:  
We would like to get to know Indonesia and its people, and so play our small part in 
improving relationships between our countries, and in improving the understanding of 
the peoples of Australia and Indonesia have of each other. To us it seems that the future 
of the human race lies with Asia.166 
His application was swiftly reviewed by the Melbourne Committee and by the Jakarta 
Committee of active volunteers.  
 
The minutes of the meeting in Jakarta record that the committee members were 
enthusiastic about the application, writing ‘We are very pleased about them, and will 
be on the mark to “guide” their applications as soon as they reach Djakarta’.167 
Following their approval of the Scarfes for participation in the Scheme, Jim Webb 
wrote to the Indonesian Embassy with a short letter of whole-hearted support, 
declaring that both were ‘extremely interested in people and possess a large measure 
of idealism. At the same time they have carefully considered the problems associated 
with working in Indonesia as volunteers, and are aware of what this will involve’.168  
 
With a warm letter of support from Webb and two Embassy staff willing to vouch 
personally for them, the Scarfes seemed justifiably confident that they would be 
quickly approved by the Indonesian Government, as indeed they were. However, 
their plan to work in Indonesia came to a shuddering halt when the Department of 
External Affairs rejected their application, with no explanation given, in a letter dated 
6 April 1956.169 
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While no reason was given by the Department for the rejection of the Scarfes, the 
couple immediately suspected that it was due to Wendy Scarfe’s previous association 
with the Communist Party. They were close, but the reason cited in ministerial 
correspondence was more mundane: ‘[Allan] Scarfe was once a member of the 
‘Labour Club’ at Melbourne Univ. – which is a Com. [communist] show’.170  
  
Jim Webb wrote a letter to the Department asking that a meeting be arranged in 
Canberra for Mr. and Mrs. Scarfe to plead their case. Conscious of the political 
background to the rejection, Webb restated that the Scheme vouched for the sincerity 
of the couple and attempted to resolve the issue with officers from the Department. 
After unofficial meetings in Melbourne with the Scarfes and departmental officers, he 
implored the Department to trust the committee. ‘These applicants’, Webb wrote: 
are well known to this Committee and we are fully acquainted with the details of their 
past activities. From our intimate knowledge of these two graduates we are convinced 
that their desire to work in Indonesia is based on genuine humanitarian and non-
political considerations.171   
The Department refused to discuss the matter, reminding Webb that ‘it is a matter of 
principle that we deal direct with individuals concerned in correspondence regarding 
applications for appointments’.172 The Scarfes had already written to the Department 
requesting either a review or the reason why their applications were refused, to 
which the departmental officer responsible replied obliquely that they were ‘unable 
to give that [the Indonesian] Government an unqualified recommendation for your 
employment in their administration’.173  
 
In all subsequent communications on the matter, Webb reaffirmed the right of the 
Australian Government to refuse applicants. Allan Scarfe advised the Indonesian 
Embassy of the situation in a letter, writing that: 
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My wife and I feel extremely indignant that our characters and reputations should be 
condemned in this off-hand way, without our even being told the charges against us, so 
that we might defend our professional ability or our personal integrity.174 
Allan Scarfe offered to work for the Indonesian Government outside the Scheme. 
Shortly afterwards, Ubani from the Indonesian Embassy advised Webb that not only 
would it be difficult for the Indonesian Government to offer employment to any 
person rejected by External Affairs, it would be ‘especially difficult if it is on political 
grounds’, and that nothing further could be done.175   
 
Despite Webb falling into line with the Department, other individuals involved in the 
Scheme were restive. The committee in Jakarta discussed whether rejection by 
External Affairs meant that the Scheme should cease assisting the Scarfes, who had 
attempted to bypass the Australian Government by seeking employment directly in 
Indonesia. A handwritten notation to the 7 July minutes from the Jakarta committee, 
dated 15 July, advised Webb that: 
At the above meeting there was a lot of discussion, mainly between Herb [Feith] and 
Thel [Thelma Rungkat, née Ashton] about whether the V.G.S. could have anything more, 
officially, to do with the Scarfes after EA had confirmed their rejection. Officially or 
unofficially however, Thel is making enquiries on their behalf from her ‘mates’ in PPK 
[the English Language Inspectorate].176 
 
After the rejection of the Scarfes, applicants would need to be screened by the 
Australian Government before they were forwarded to Jakarta or any placements 
offered, protecting against future embarrassment.177 Ultimately, the Scarfes were not 
able to find work in Indonesia without the blessing of the VGS. They instead went to 
England shortly after their rejection. Years later, they both found work in India, 
where they taught at rural schools and practiced similar principles of intercultural 
understanding, community-based assistance, and nation-building that the Scheme 
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claimed as its own – within a framework that substituted Gandhian community 
development for Indonesian nationalism.178 
 
In the small world of student activism, the Scarfe affair continued to resonate after 
they had left Australia. The Scarfes had written to their local Member of Parliament, 
Jim Cairns, who was identified with the left-wing of the Labor Party.179 Cairns raised 
the matter with the Leader of the Opposition, H. V. Evatt, and with the Minister. While 
there was no discussion of the Scarfes in Parliament, Richard Casey responded to 
Cairns’ letter, replying that ‘we could not, in any circumstances, send abroad at 
Government expense, and sponsor to a foreign Government for employment in its 
service, people in whom we did not have the fullest confidence’, before finishing with 
his own assessment of the Scheme: ‘we cannot afford to accept any risk that its high 
reputation might be impaired’.180 Evatt, meanwhile, used the Scarfe case at a meeting 
of the University of Sydney ALP Club as an example of the threat to academic freedom 
that the anti-communist atmosphere of the 1950s had created. This caused the case 
to ricochet again around the networks of student activists.  
 
The President of NUAUS, David Teplitzky, wrote to Webb that Evatt had ‘made some 
remarks deploring University students’ talk of concerns with academic freedom, 
while in actual fact working on another basis’.181 Teplitzky then recounted that Evatt 
had (incorrectly): 
alleged that a man and his wife, who wanted to be science teachers, had been rejected 
on the say-so of information, or as he put it “as the National Student Body with 
headquarters in Melbourne”, on the grounds that the wife had been a member of the 
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Communist Party six years ago. From remarks that he subsequently made it appeared 
that Dr. Evatt was incensed about the matter.182 
The NUAUS President suggested that Webb consult Hansard and prepare an 
explanatory statement for Evatt and the Sydney ALP Club President. Lest his 
sympathy be seen to lie with communists, Teplitsky added his own opinion to the 
situation, suggesting ‘attention should be drawn to the actions of the persons 
concerned who must have raised this matter with their local member, since I believe 
this clearly proves their unsuitability for going to Indonesia’.183  
 
The President of NUAUS was not the only student officer to contact Webb after 
hearing about the Scarfe case. The President of the University of Western Australia 
Student Guild, Kim Paterson, advised Webb that a motion to investigate the matter 
had been passed by the Guild’s governing council at its August meeting.184 A month 
later, Paterson wrote to the NUAUS President that the Guild Council ‘feels very 
strongly on this matter’, and recommended that he approach the Menzies 
Government to request that the reasons for selection or rejection be made available 
to the candidates and the VGS National Committee.185 Webb replied firmly, 
responding that the Australian Government ‘not surprisingly’ reserved the right to 
assess applicants independent of the VGS. He also, perhaps disingenuously, criticised 
the furore that had erupted over their rejection, suggesting that ‘in the absence of any 
detailed official statement we can only speculate as to the reasons for the decision, as 
presumably a number of people have done’.186  
 
The experience of the Scarfes was exceptional, but reveals what could be invoked in 
the process for sending graduates to Indonesia. Departmental officials – with the 
backing of the Minister – stepped in after the committee and Indonesian Government 
both approved applicants whom they considered to be subversive. The VGS acted as a 
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middle man between idealistic young people and a government that judged 
suitability for participation through a political lens. It is little wonder that Richard 
Casey, a fervent anti-communist, would perceive the Cold War at play in the Scheme. 
Some of his thought processes can be discerned from a contemporaneous diary entry 
which quoted approvingly US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Soviets, 
according to Dulles, had not given up their aim to ‘Communise the world’, but instead 
had shifted emphasis to a ‘Trojan horse’ stratagem of subversion.187 Throughout the 
first half of 1956, when he vetoed the Scarfes, Casey was in part preoccupied by a 
question of greater significance: whether to resume diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union after the Petrov spying scandal.188  
 
At the same time, the VGS experienced pressure from within its student community 
base to take a stand against what was seen as an attack on academic freedom, leaving 
it balancing between pressures from above to accept the government’s final say and 
from below to assert independence. The VGS had arrived at a formula for assessing 
applications which emphasised certain characteristics – motivation, temperament, 
and zeal – that were difficult to objectively determine, but which could restrict radical 
applicants and aligned very closely with the middle-class values that were then being 
promoted by the Australian Government.  
 
The application process intentionally filtered out those whose values or 
temperament diverged too radically from those espoused by the ASCM. It filtered out, 
either deliberately or unintentionally, individuals from a communist background or 
with communist sympathies. The reverse is also true: the Scheme’s ASCM boosters 
sought like-minded individuals to recruit, leaving a space within the organisation for 
a reflexive anti-communism to establish itself. This would play a role in shaping the 
interactions that these individuals would have in Indonesia, as they shifted Cold War 
arenas to the fierce divisions of Indonesian society.  
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Crossing the Bridge: Australians in Cold War Indonesia 
The above evidence shows that Cold War anxieties influenced the VGS and its 
activities in Australia. But these same individuals also engaged with, or their actions 
were influenced by, the Cold War debates within Indonesia around the clash of 
communism and anti-communist or pro-Western values. The general, and perhaps 
inevitable, position in which the VGS found itself contributed to this: as the Scheme 
developed, the relationships that it formed skewed naturally towards anti-
communist and pro-Western forces in Indonesia. This created a particular view of 
Indonesian society, and the remedies for its ills, that affirmed the anti-communist 
preconceptions that volunteers brought with them. At the same time, the volunteers 
recognised the precariousness of their own position, and emphasised the Scheme’s 
distinction from ‘pushful’ foreigners and the ‘propaganda work’ with which the latter 
were associated.  
 
The Scheme and Cold War politics in Indonesia 
The volunteers placed great value on their difference from other aid organisations 
and perceived foreign interference in Indonesia. Opposition to being publicly linked 
to the Colombo Plan – which was expressly aimed at bolstering new nation-states 
against communism – reveals the vexed nature of their position in the Cold War. 
Responding to a request that the Scheme be incorporated into Colombo Plan 
promotional publications, the Jakarta Committee responded that they were ‘not 
against the Colombo Plan as such’, but that only publicity of the ‘most modest and 
carefully thought out kind’ was of any value. They also noted that one of their 
departmental liaisons in Canberra ‘shares with us a horror of blatant American-and-
Russian-type propaganda’.189 Even promoting the principles of the Scheme within 
Indonesia was viewed as a hazardous venture, with the potential that the Scheme be 
considered another power play in the Cold War. Webb echoed the complaints of 
volunteers that their wage equality with locals wasn’t better known, but conceded 
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that any more publicity ‘may cause difficulties such as the scheme being seen as some 
new form of interference backed by powerful propaganda.190 
 
This did not mean that the VGS could sit on the sidelines of the Cold War. The VGS 
operated at a time of heightened concern over communism in Asia, and it is 
unsurprising that the Scheme engaged with these anxieties within its membership. 
The Scheme’s creators were aware of the connection between aid and the Cold War, 
even as they distanced themselves from it. In one pamphlet, not intended for general 
circulation, the Scheme positioned their project within the debates induced by the 
Cold War among Australians, explaining that: 
Although strong Asian nations could threaten our security, it is now felt to be necessary 
that we help them in their problems lest they turn to Communism for the answers, as 
China did. A Communist Asia is the greater of two evils. So many feel that ‘Aid to Asia’ is 
forced upon us as an antidote to Communism.191 
The pamphlet explicitly stated the Scheme had different aims than this, but to pursue 
their objectives the volunteers worked closely with anti-communist Indonesian 
organisations that shared the sense of Christian and student affinities which 
underpinned the Scheme. The Indonesian Student Christian Movement, who were the 
intellectual and spiritual counterparts to the ASCM and had a strongly anti-
communist leadership, helped locate suitable accommodation for visitors from 
Australia. Like its Australian equivalent NUAUS, the Indonesian National Student 
Union, had severed ties with the International Union of Students due to its pro-
communist sympathies.192 The VGS also maintained connections with anti-communist 
American philanthropic foundations, which led to questions over its independence 
and purpose. The volunteers were familiar with American philanthropic foundations 
from a university setting; one of the chief academic proponents of the Scheme, 
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Macmahon Ball, had received significant funding from the Rockefeller Foundation to 
further his research on Asian nationalism.193  
 
Of these foundations, the volunteers had the most interactions with the Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, which itself serves to highlight the complexities of Cold 
War influences on actors in Indonesia at the time. Established to support research 
into Indonesian society, especially the influence of nationalism and communism, the 
Modern Indonesia Project was funded by the Ford Foundation after a minor ‘red 
scare’ against the Ford Company during the most strident period of the McCarthyist 
witch-hunts.194 It was recently described by International Studies scholar Inderjeet 
Parmar, as ‘a program of surveillance (albeit academic) and study of the power 
structure, political movements, and decision makers in Indonesia’. This, in turn, 
‘fostered, constructed, developed, and consolidated a nascent modernizing 
knowledge network’ that was aligned with the state apparatus, American academia, 
and the anti-communism of US foreign policy.195 But many of the scholars of the 
Modern Indonesia Project held views on American foreign policy and the 
appropriateness of Western interventions in Southeast Asia contrary to anti-
communist orthodoxies, best exemplified by the key figure in the Modern Indonesia 
Project’s creation, George Kahin. While much of the funding for his research came 
from ostensibly ‘anti-communist’ sources, such as the Ford Foundation criticised by 
Parmar, Kahin personally and professionally held a dissenting view on American 
foreign policy. This dissent stretched back to his time as a student, when he refused 
to distance himself from his supervisor, Owen Lattimore, after Lattimore was accused 
of being partly to blame for the ‘loss’ of China. His critique of American foreign policy 
would go on to develop into active participation in the Vietnam War ‘teach-ins’ of the 
1960s.196  
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The volunteer’s interactions with the Cold War were not restricted to associating 
with individuals with decisive views; they also gave their own views on the subject. 
Writing for an Australian audience, the articles in Djembatan show that volunteers 
were openly derisive of communists and the radical left. The fallout from the 
campaign targeting the continuing Dutch presence in Indonesia that began in late 
1957 in response to the West New Guinea crisis, and which culminated in the 
expulsion of Dutch citizens and the nationalisation of Dutch businesses, were the 
subject of several letters admonishing the left. One volunteer, John Gare, explained 
that the populist phase of the campaign felt like being in the middle of a ‘classical 
communist revolution cunningly superimposed on the West Irian programme’, 
though he was reassured by Indonesian friends that government moves to control 
industry were temporary ‘and not taking over or even yet nationalisation’. 197 Another 
volunteer, Thelma Rungkat, was even more blunt. Her view was that the ‘Commos’ 
used the Dutch ‘for hanging on the grievances of ordinary people’. The communists 
‘were smart enough’ to use anti-Dutch sentiment to take over businesses in the 
capital, Rungkat went on, and ‘nearly got away with it completely’. Finishing with 
confidence, Rungkat declared ‘I don’t really think the Communists would be so strong 
it wqs [sic] not that they are so clever at making much of national causes when it suits 
them’.198 Beth and Ray Mylius expressed concern at the power struggles between the 
Islamic political movement Masyumi and the communists, proffering that ‘many 
suggest hesitantly that perhaps a more authoritarian kind of government will be 
required to handle the country’s affairs’.199  
 
While they were contemptuous of the communists, the volunteers were also quick to 
understand the resonance of the communist message. In June 1958, volunteer Elaine 
Wills reported further on the crisis involving West New Guinea. Dismissing the Soviet 
media tag ‘spearhead of Australian and Dutch aggression in South East Asia’ given to 
West New Guinea, Wills nevertheless offered reasons why ‘this would not be hard for 
Java to believe’, before listing perceived Australian and Dutch transgressions.200  
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Volunteer Harry Whitfield’s review of the best-seller The Ugly American criticised 
those who refused to understand the popularity of communist politics: ‘Our standard 
of living is higher than the Russians; but are we offering our standard of living to the 
Asians? The motivation of a foreign policy is as important as its execution’.201  
 
Compared with their expressed views on communism, the position volunteers held 
on Westernisation were far more mixed. The volunteers were openly contemptuous 
of the ‘expatriates’ and ‘foreign experts’ that they saw as the last vestiges of the 
colonial order. In the UNESCO-funded edition of Djembatan, Betty Feith excoriated 
and mourned in equal part Westerners who fell into ‘the trap’ of joining the 
tenaciously still-existent ‘old colonial way of life’.202 Whitfield was simply excoriating. 
These foreigners ‘lived the expatriate life of drinking, gossiping, and immorality 
resulting from boredom and the gradual disintegration of exiles with no care for the 
society around them’.203 But Betty Feith also acknowledged part of her own role, and 
that of other volunteers, involved exposing Indonesian minds to Western thought and 
tradition. Wondering whether language classes were being used by Indonesians as a 
‘means to an understanding of Western thought and tradition’, she expressed 
sureness that they would ‘keep open minds’ and if learning English ‘gives access to 
new currents of thought and makes possible interchange of views and values, then 
surely it is worthwhile’.204  
 
Other volunteers were unwilling to concede that missionaries or Western education 
were negative influences, even when presented with the views of locals.  In the 
conclusion of her report on West New Guinea, Elaine Wills informed her readers that 
she had tried to offer a balance of her own impressions and the views of the locals, 
with one exception. She had censored the views of the locals on missionary work, she 
wrote, ‘because I’ve heard nothing but criticism of it’, but ‘didn’t see a village under 
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this influence or see the “bad effects” of teaching that “all men are equal” and that 
“you shouldn’t work on Sunday”!’205  
 
The relationship with the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and its officials in Indonesia 
were a source of wariness and conflicting views – for both sides. Senior figures in the 
Embassy were sceptical of the Scheme, seeing the close connections that the 
volunteers were making with suspect radicals as proof it was dangerous. In 1957 the 
Australian Ambassador to Indonesia wrote to a senior official in the Department of 
External Affairs, warning of the influence of the ‘sinister creature’, Molly Bondan, on 
the volunteers. Apart from being ‘anti-white and anti-Australian’, Molly Bondan’s 
previous work alongside Australian communists during the post-war pro-Indonesian 
strikes of the 1940s was a major source of concern. The departmental official replied 
that he was ‘most disturbed’, and had ‘always feared this situation with Volunteer 
Graduates’, and would recommend that ‘we go slow with the Volunteer Graduate 
Scheme’.206 In contrast to these suspicions, less than two years before key VGS figure 
Jim Webb had been approached to work for the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and 
manage the Colombo Plan. Despite the VGS wishing to distinguish itself from the 
Australian Government, volunteers were enthusiastic about the informal contacts 
and networks that this would promote between the Colombo Plan and the Indonesian 
civil service.207  
 
In the event, rather than Webb, the position of Colombo Plan officer was given to Sam 
Dimmick. However, this did not weaken the Scheme’s links with either the Colombo 
Plan or the Embassy. Dimmick was already well known to the VGS: an alumnus of the 
University of Melbourne, he had been involved in the ASCM and served as President 
of the Students’ Representative Council.208 Even though volunteer Hugh O’Neill 
recalled being welcomed to Jakarta by Dimmick with the stern warning to steer clear 
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of Molly Bondan – a warning ignored without regret – relations between Dimmick 
and some volunteers were warm enough that correspondence with him could mix 
personal well wishes, questions regarding official business, and gossip on the latest 
controversies within the Australian student movement, such as the politically 
charged debate whether to accept an invite for a student delegation to visit the 
Peoples’ Republic of China.209  
 
These references to communism, anti-communism and development do not amount 
to evidence of any systematic Cold War intervention into Indonesian politics on 
behalf of the ‘Free World’. But they do show that the Cold War played a role in the 
history of the VGS that is open to debate and further scrutiny, especially with regards 
to its implications for the legacies of the VGS. One such legacy is that left by Herb 
Feith, perhaps the Scheme’s most celebrated participant. Feith has been rightfully 
recognised for his commitment to peace, nuclear disarmament, and social justice in 
Australia and overseas, alongside his prolific academic career as a political scientist.  
But to present Feith’s life as a continuous engagement with progressive politics, or to 
place his experiences and insights associated with his time involved in the VGS on an 
unbent path of progressive activism is misleading. As Feith himself conceded, before 
the mid-1960s he would not have been considered a person of the left ‘in any sense’, 
while his immediate response to the anti-communist massacres of 1965-1966 saw 
him branded an apologist for the violence – by close friends, no less.210  The 
dissonance of the 1970s, when Feith promoted radical peace and democratic activism 
while the thesis of his most famous work, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia, was embraced by the New Order regime, is understandable in the context 
of how Feith came to understand ‘Old Order’ Indonesian society.211  The letters Herb 
Feith sent home, documenting his experiences and views as he understood them in 
the moment, provide a test case for the role that the Cold War played in these 
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legacies. Feith used his experiences and connections to become a globally-recognised 
expert on Indonesian affairs, but in gaining the experiences and insights that he did, 
he was also navigating the conflicts of the Cold War. It is to Feith and these legacies 
that we can now turn.  
 
Engaging with the Cold War: Herb Feith 
Analysis of the experiences of Herb Feith, and of his understanding of Cold War-
inflected debates around communism, Christianity, and nationalism in Indonesia, 
shows that there were far more complex factors at play in the history of the VGS than 
a simple pro- and anti- Western / pro- and anti- communist dichotomy, but that the 
Cold War was essential to the understanding that volunteers brought to and took 
away from their experiences in Indonesia.  
 
During the time that he volunteered in Indonesia, Feith was a deeply committed 
Christian. This faith forms a key narrative in his biography, From Vienna to 
Yogyakarta.212 But his Christianity, it may be suggested, also held a political edge that 
was foundational to Feith’s understanding of what he saw and experienced. This 
Christianity brought with it a conflicted view of what the West had to offer Indonesia, 
but was also a way to connect with locals and help guide the evidence that he saw and 
valued. This pattern was established early, with one of Herb Feith’s first and most 
important connections in Indonesia: Tina Franz, the head of the Indonesian Student 
Christian Movement. Franz was an active nationalist who used the term 
‘Philippinization’ to describe the danger that American influence was having on 
Indonesian culture, something which Feith relayed to Australian friends and family 
with approval.213  
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Feith was sceptical of Western influence. In his first travels outside Jakarta, he was 
impressed by what he perceived as the stability of village life, approvingly quoting his 
guide’s observation that it was due to ‘strong religious influence, the community 
consciousness and the weakness of Western influences’.214 But Western influence, in 
moderation, could be a positive. Feith wrote in awestruck terms of the Christian-
majority town of Manado in North Sulawesi, which he saw as incorporating the best 
aspects of Western influence into a robust traditional community. It was unique, he 
wrote, for it had ‘everything worthwhile’ that the West ‘could offer’: Christianity and 
education, good organization and cleanliness, an ‘all-pervading atmosphere of 
freedom’, but at the same time without losing its sense of community. But there was a 
threat looming, of ‘Hollywood-sponsored’ disintegration. Christianity and the simple 
old traditions were strong enough to hold it off, he hoped, but there was the threat 
that it would become consumerist and celebrity-obsessed like ‘most of the “free” and 
coca-cola-buying world’.215 
 
While worrying about the impact of ‘free’ world values, Feith also perceived 
communism as a dangerous threat that the Indonesian public was ignoring. While 
noting the tendency to exaggerate the threat posed by communism, Feith wrote to his 
family that ‘the Communists’ tactics are impressive and I’m sure that Indonesians are 
not nearly aware enough of their danger’.216 
 
His antipathy towards communism was more than philosophical. It affected the 
personal connections – central as they were to the mission of the Scheme – which he 
made. In another letter home, Feith recounted a night spent with a communist 
parliamentarian, whom he was introduced to by his landlord and friend, the 
nationalist-aligned civil servant Mustapha. He recalled the poor impression that the 
politician made: 
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On Tuesday night Mustapha got a visit from a certain Hutomo Supardan, said to be the 
brightest of the Communist MPs. Very nicely Mustapha allowed me to argue with him 
almost the whole night. I don’t think he’s a very remarkable man. He knows his line well 
as most Communists do, and gives you neither more nor less. Apart from a couple of 
“mistakes” about the role of great men in history, he argued in just the same way as 
Australian Communists do. He’s very China-oriented though that doesn’t by any means 
mean that he’s less Russian-oriented. Also very keen on immediate building up of heavy 
industry here in Indonesia – with capital aid, he hopes, from all countries including the 
West. Rather soft for a Communist, though hard for an Indonesian – but on the whole 
very much like party people everywhere. Not unpleasant to argue with, but I’d prefer to 
be elsewhere if he got into power here just the same!217 
In contrast, Feith recognised an affinity with the liberal-minded technocrats and 
intellectuals of the pro-Western Socialist Party, which had a strong presence in the 
Indonesian civil service at that time. His letters to the family show the warmth and 
connections that he made with pro-Western Indonesians. Apart from often praising 
Syahrir, the Socialist Party leader, Feith met with many Socialist politicians. In 
contrast to his views on Hutomo Supardan, he described Subadio, the parliamentary 
leader of the Socialists as ‘a highly intelligent young bloke, as keen and excitable as 
any University Labor Club person and yet deeply responsible and far-sighted’, 
harking back to his own campus partisanship218 
 
In a similar vein, Feith – like other volunteers – felt a warmth and sense of 
camaraderie towards American and Western scholars in Indonesia. He became very 
close friends with George Kahin of Cornell University, in time securing Kahin as a 
doctoral supervisor, and other now-famous American scholars such as Clifford and 
Hildred Geertz were fondly mentioned to friends and family at home.219 The 
connections were close enough between American researchers and the volunteers 
that Feith’s house on Jalan Halimun became known as a meeting place for such 
foreign visitors and volunteer graduates to meet and discuss politics and the state of 
Indonesian society.220 This warmth and sense of camaraderie contrasts starkly with 
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Feith’s treatment of an Indonesianist from the other side of the Iron Curtain, whom 
he met at an international fair in Jakarta in 1954. In a letter home, Feith made clear 
that the Cold War divided them. It was a ‘strange experience to find oneself face-to-
face with a Russian’, he confided, ‘with not even a language difficulty to overcome’. 
While he was impressed by his Soviet counterpart’s Indonesian language skills, he 
‘felt the tension’ when he inquired about facilities for Indonesian language study in 
the USSR, and surmised that the ‘bloke was obviously politically alert and well-
trained’. 221   
 
Considering the role of the VGS as a program for intercultural understanding 
predicated on the power of personal connections, these networks connected with and 
reinforced Western perspectives on Indonesian political issues. That a volunteer such 
as Feith could be dismissive of local communists and suspicious of Soviet interest in 
Indonesia, while being admiring of pro-Western Indonesians and warm towards 
Americans, show that the Scheme acted in a way that contributed to the 
delegitimisation – in however modest a degree – of the position of radical thought, 
practice, and appeal in Indonesian society.  
 
But elsewhere, the fear of creeping Americanisation is evident across Feith’s writings, 
divorced from his commentary on Western researchers, pro-Western politicians, and 
Christian-majority communities in Indonesia. In one letter, he wrote that ‘in the long 
run there’s no power to stop Hollywood this side of the Iron Curtain – it’s not a 
matter of culture or politics, purely money. Really I fear Hollywood more than ever 
before’.222 Feith was also very critical of other aid projects that he saw as falling into 
the pattern of pushing American or Western values, complaining to his friend Eric 
Edwards that:  
Really you’ve no idea how complicated and important that question is. Just how to go 
about giving help that will both do good and be genuinely appreciated? Yes, the 
psychological and political and sheer practical complications of any form of foreign help 
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to Indonesia are tremendous, and that goes both in the Church and the general sphere. 
How one should go about offering scholarships abroad, how one should encourage 
reciprocity in relations between Indonesia and the country willing to help her, how one 
should publicize “aid”, all these questions involve moral and psychological and political 
principles that just haven’t been sufficiently thought about. If you knew the mistakes 
that the Americans, often with the best of intentions behind all their pushfulness, are 
making in the Church and Mission field as well as the political one.223  
 
It is important to note that these critiques were formed with input from his 
Indonesian colleagues, and were not merely the outcome of Feith’s own thinking on 
the matter. Rather than being the vector for hegemonic pro-Western ideas, the 
volunteers appear to utilise both anti-communist and anti-Western discourses that 
were already present in Indonesian society, but that they approved of: Herb Feith, 
along with Molly Bondan, organised a discussion group within the Ministry of 
Information. Feith relayed the outcome of a discussion involving ‘twenty odd’ people 
from his sub-section, concurring with their despair at American influence and the 
inability of Indonesia’s revolutionary ideology to sustain itself among adolescents.224  
 
Linked to this form of engagement was the keen awareness the volunteers held of 
their precarious position in the Indonesian political sphere, which required 
circumspection and the appearance of being apolitical. In his 1954 report to NUAUS, 
Jim Webb expressed the fear that it would only take one ‘misfit’ to ‘ruin’ the 
Scheme.225 When the idea was floated that the Scheme should, like many non-
governmental organisations, have a committee of eminent persons to serve as 
patrons and the public face of the program, the response from the volunteers in 
Indonesia was unequivocally opposed, responding that it would make them look 
‘much less like ordinary people’ and more likely to have a ‘political background’. 
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‘Change is always best avoided in these circumstances’, Feith wrote on their behalf, ‘It 
confuses Indonesians, if it doesn’t actually make them suspicious’.226  
Volunteers, including Herb Feith, could not stand apart from the debates and 
personalities of the Cold War. They were politically engaged individuals working in a 
politicised environment, interacting on a daily basis with other politically engaged 
individuals. The choices that they made, the experiences that they gained, and the 




The Cold War had a decisive influence on how the intercultural connections between 
Australia and Indonesia developed after Indonesian independence. Within Australia, 
the VGS operated in an atmosphere of heightened suspicion and scrutiny of political 
thought and action. The Department of External Affairs acted as a gatekeeper for 
these non-governmental interactions, asserting the Australian Government’s right to 
examine and reject – on whatever grounds it wished – applicants that it felt were 
undesirable. While the records indicate that this veto was used only once, for the 
applications of the Scarfes, it loomed over the administrators of the Scheme as they 
made the high ideals of intercultural friendship and understanding a reality. Even 
without the direct pressure that the Australian Government brought to bear on the 
VGS, the Cold War remained influential. Many individuals involved in the Scheme had 
anti-communist sympathies, of varying intensity and expression.  
 
The impact of the Cold War on the Scheme within Indonesia followed naturally from 
the impact of decisions made about the Scheme in Australia, but were also grounded 
in what they experienced firsthand. Volunteers, a cohort that excluded suspected 
communist sympathisers and drew directly from anti-communist student 
organisations, felt an affinity with the non-communist and anti-communist elements 
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of Indonesian society. Likewise, the volunteers engaged with American scholars and 
visitors who were often in Indonesia as part of the Cold War-inspired boom in Area 
Studies, or due to opportunities provided by philanthropic foundations. That these 
first, tentative steps towards intercultural understanding were anti-communist in 
practice had long-lasting impact, as the volunteers parlayed their experience in 
Indonesia into expertise on the subject in Australia and the wider world. Underlining 
this knowledge and this authority can be seen the tendrils of the Cold War, shaping 
the discourses, ideas, and new networks of knowledge as they arose from these 
experiences. The Cold War was not alone in its impact. The VGS was defined by its 
avowed opposition to the White Australia Policy, and the ambiguities around racial, 
national, and gender identities played a central part in defining the experiences that 




4.  Identity, White Australia, and the Volunteer Graduate Scheme. 
The VGS was formed from, and embedded within, a society in which the White 
Australia Policy reigned supreme. Yet the VGS occupied an unusual position. It was 
critical of the White Australia Policy and dedicated to breaking down existing 
barriers between Australia and Asia, but also reliant upon the goodwill of the 
Australian Government to function. The history of the VGS reveals some of the 
processes that were occurring in Australian society that affected post-war interest in 
Asia, the changing understanding of national identity and – very importantly – the 
interplay between race and gender.  
 
Three main aspects of the relationship between the VGS and the White Australia 
Policy will be discussed here. The first is the role played by post-war immigration in 
Australia’s engagement with Asia.  As will be argued, there are strong connections 
between Australian experiences arising from the mass migration of people from non-
English speaking backgrounds and interest in Asia as expressed through the VGS.  
The chapter then turns to the role of ‘Australian’ identity’ in the evolution of the 
Scheme. In this context, evidence is that the VGS – unsurprisingly perhaps – was far 
from immune to on-going ambiguities and conflicts about what it meant to be 
‘Australian’: indeed, the experiences of migrant applicants to the Scheme, in 
particular, show the ways in which the realities of a changing and diversifying 
Australian society were glossed over in the interests of projecting a certain middle-
class ideal of Australian society, one that incorporated a lingering connection to 
British identity.  
 
Finally, this chapter turns its attention to the role of gender in the Scheme. Within the 
middle-class ideal of Australian identity were racialised and gendered norms that 
were thrown into stark relief by female participation in the Scheme. As outlined 
briefly below, gendered anxieties have always been an essential element of how 
White Australia was understood, from its very foundation as a masculinist attempt to 
create a ‘White Man’s Country’. This section centres on how the Scheme negotiated 
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gender in its opposition to the White Australia Policy, and shows that attitudes 
regarding the role of women in the organisation complicated its activities and stated 
aims. Some of the negative attitudes ranged from despair that female applicants 
would damage the Scheme’s reputation and fear over the repercussions of 
anticipated interracial marriages, through to direct questioning of the loyalty of 
female Australian volunteers who did marry Indonesian nationals. Conversely, by the 
end of the 1950s, the VGS was actively challenging the Australian Government on 
interracial marriages, and had begun viewing these ‘international’ marriages as a 
pure distillation of the Scheme’s ideals. Through the experience of border crossing 
from Australia to Indonesia, this chapter shows, some women developed a different 
understanding of their own position within a society and economy that prioritised 
the ‘male breadwinner’ household.   
 
The focus of many scholars of White Australia has been centred on the dominant 
racialist ideology and the historical basis for it. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds 
have argued that it was a representative policy of a ‘transnational solidarity’ based on 
the concept of ‘whiteness’, a racial classification that erased existing distinctions 
between nationalities and ethnicities and saw the solidification of the ideal of ‘White 
Men’s countries’ in the settler societies of the United States, South Africa and 
Australia in the late nineteenth century – something which only unravelled after 
World War Two.227 Other historians, particularly those in the field of labour history 
such as Goodall and Martinez, have looked at the hidden cosmopolitanism of 
Australia in this period – the contradictory gaps, no matter how small, in the 
supposedly all-encompassing White Australia. For example, substantial scholarship 
has gone into studying pearl divers in northern Australia and into compiling 
transnational histories of Indian ‘lascars’ who were integral to maintaining Britain’s 
maritime empire, but formally excluded from Australia.228  
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What has not been adequately explored in detail is the discomfort and low-key 
opposition expressed towards the White Australia Policy, and how the changes that 
occurred during the post-war period became the seeds of ‘White’ Australia’s 
unravelling.229 It is clear from memoir and biographical material that there were 
many groups active in opposing White Australia by the 1940s, and the participants in 
these groups played multiple roles which intersected with the promotion of 
Australian-Indonesian relations, the management of changes from the demographic 
surge due to post-war mass migration, and concern with the implications of the Cold 
War.230 Jim Cairns, a future Deputy Prime Minister, serves as a perfect example of 
these intersections. Cairns served variously as President of the ‘East-West 
Committee’ and patron of the Australian-Indonesian Association of Victoria, as well 
as in various peace and neutralist groups.231 Other less well known activists, such as 
Molly Bondan, represent a link between the anti-White Australia milieu that had 
developed in Australia into the very specific cause of Indonesia and Australian-
Indonesian relations.  
 
These changes in post-war racial attitudes have usually been analysed in three 
discrete spheres: Australian attitudes to Asia and decolonisation; migration and the 
transition from assimilation to multiculturalism, and the struggle for rights and 
recognition for Indigenous Australia. Few attempts have been made to reconcile 
these spheres, even though at their heart they present contradictory 
characterisations of Australian society in the 1950s: at once Australia is taken to be 
both booming and changing beyond recognition in a dynamic process of nation-
building, and a deeply conservative society almost wholly reactionary in its policies 
and attitudes towards the outside world.  
 
Jamie Mackie, a friend of the VGS who published extensively on the Indonesian 
economy, the Chinese ethnic minority of Indonesia, and Australian-Indonesian 
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relations, presented an ‘admittedly impressionistic’, but unifying thesis on the 
historical factors behind changing race relations in Australia. Mackie hypothesised 
that: 
perhaps the acceptance of a diversity of European immigrants and then an 
increased flow of Asians was an experience Australian society had to undergo 
before it was ready to tackle the problems of trying to do justice to the 
Aborigines and of coming to terms with the non-white countries around us 
with some confidence of succeeding. At least we now know that Australians are 
not incurably racist in outlook, as some would have us believe.232  
Taking the VGS as the point at which to look outwards on Australian society is an 
opportunity to test this hypothesis, but also to understand how and why Mackie – an 
individual who first rose to prominence during that period – placed such significance 
on these seemingly anecdotal connections.  
 
Migration Booms and Expanding Horizons: Post-War Australia in Flux 
It is easy to contrast the turmoil of post-war Indonesian politics and civil society with 
the seeming calm of post-war Australia. Whereas Indonesian politics was dominated 
by debates over ideological orientation, the legacy of imperialism, and the 
construction of a modern nation-state, Australia’s transition to relative stability – 
even quiet – in the post-war years appears to confirm the perspective of individuals 
such as The Bulletin journalist Peter Hastings, who derided Australian society after 
the war in terms of the ‘Lotus Years’, in which the Australian people ‘lived high and 
ate well and … were distressingly indifferent to the changing world about us’.233 This 
caricature of Australia as a leisured and insular place, even as the reality of 
decolonisation and a new global order threatened to disturb its collective lethargy, 
masks the monumental changes that took place within Australian society and its 
global outlook in this period. It was 1948 when Australian citizenship was first 
established, replacing British subjecthood.  
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A program of mass migration, which encouraged non-British European migrants, 
created a cultural and linguistic diversity that belied the continued consensus in 
favour of the White Australia Policy; this should instead be seen, in the words of the 
historian Eric Richards, as the ‘heroic age’ of migration in Australian history.234 
Coupled with this, Australian universities enrolled significant numbers of students 
from Asia through their role in the Colombo Plan, creating small communities of self-
celebrating multiracialism in the heart of Australia’s major cities. The election in 
1957 of Sam Abraham, a Malayan-born Medical student, to the post of President of 
the Student Representative Council at the University of Adelaide serves as one 
anecdotal counterpoint to the homogenously white and mono-cultural image that 
Australia projected, and which the dominant historiography continued to accept until 
very recently.235   
 
Australian attitudes towards Asia in the post-war years – at both the ‘elite’ level and 
the level of popular discourse – have often been characterised as in essence 
reactionary: that it was the process of decolonisation, plus the subsequent demands 
of the new system of nation-states and the Cold War, that governed how and why 
Australians interacted with the governments and populations of Asia. The opening 
paragraph of Facing Asia, a history of the Colombo Plan, is a perfect example of this 
paradigm:  
For most of their history, Australians have seen themselves as a beleaguered white 
outpost of the British Empire, perched precariously between the hordes of Asia and the 
edge of the world. They looked north with a mixture of ignorance, wonder and fear, and 
always through the prism of imperial design and racism. But by the middle of the 20th 
century the turmoil of the Second World War, communism and decolonisation had 
ended any possibility that the region could be ignored.236  
There is no doubt that these external factors were essential ingredients in the growth 
of these links and the expanding horizons of Australian worldviews. But at the same 
time, to treat Australian society as completely reactionary and unchanging in the 
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post-war years obscures the ways in which changes in the internal dynamic of 
Australian society affected relations and attitudes with the wider world.  
 
Research into the ways in which changes within Australian society affected attitudes 
and relations with Asia is more limited, but in Mackie’s opinion, outlined above, mass 
migration ended the illusion of cultural homogeneity and paved the way for a society 
that could embrace diversity. 237 These were experiences that Australian society ‘had 
to undergo’, he argued, before even being capable of coming to terms with the non-
white countries of the Asia Pacific.238  
 
Mackie was quoted approvingly in the influential, but now dated, book Race Relations 
in Australia: A History, but has otherwise had a limited impact on the 
historiography.239 A more recent argument, put forward in the Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, focuses especially on the role of universities in changing attitudes 
towards Asia, and compellingly argues that:  
the developing interest by university staff and students in the peoples, languages and 
politics of Asia during the 1950s, and new forms of cross-cultural sociability between 
Asian and Australian students on university campuses, directly contributed to a 
political analysis that discredited the idea of White Australia and sought to unseat one 
of the fundamental tenets of Australian nationhood’.240 
This article only briefly discussed the VGS, within the broader context of ASCM 
activities on campuses in the 1950s.241 The structure and practice of ‘cross-cultural 
sociability’ on university campuses, however, was occurring within an even broader, 
relatively new field of cross-cultural interactions for Australians in the wider 
community as well. Migration from non-English speaking countries and the effect of a 
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booming population, which brought with it new infrastructure and educational 
needs, also played a key role in a radical shift in attitudes behind the edifice of White 
Australia. 
 
These monumental changes can be traced back to the war-time Labor administration 
of John Curtin and his successor, Ben Chifley. Their administrations were intent not 
just on winning the war, but also on using the expansion of government powers that 
had accompanied the war to reconstruct Australian society. Immigration Minister 
Arthur Calwell announced a new scheme for mass immigration in 1947, pushed by 
labour and material shortages that threatened government plans for industrial 
expansion. This program aimed to rapidly add to Australia’s population, which stood 
at just over seven and half million people, and marked a significant departure from 
the established norm.242 Migrants from the United Kingdom were still given strong 
preference, but for the first time immigration from outside the white Anglophone 
world was genuinely encouraged: ‘New Australians’ would be sourced from the 
refugee camps of Europe and from non-English speaking nations with which formal 
migration deals were signed. The mass migration was considered a success: the 
millionth migrant was fêted in the press and the community when she arrived in 
1955.243  
 
One of the reasons that the migration of people previously deemed ‘undesirable’ 
became acceptable was the policy of assimilation that accompanied it. All migrants 
were to ‘assimilate’ into the dominant Anglophone culture of Australia and become 
indistinguishable from the wider Australian population. Described encouragingly by 
the Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell as ‘new healthy citizens who are determined 
to become good Australians by adoption’, migrants were not to be left to their own 
devices in learning to become Australian citizens. Instead, Calwell told the House of 
Representatives, the Australian people ‘must help newcomers to become assimilated. 
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We have been too prone in the past to ostracize those of alien birth and then blame 
them for segregating themselves and forming foreign communities. It is we, not they, 
who are generally responsible for this condition of affairs’.244 The Department of 
Immigration managed a network of education and social services for migrants, and 
‘Good Neighbour Councils’ connected newly arrived migrants with community and 
church groups in Australia, who offered to teach migrants the ‘Australian Way of 
Life’.245  
 
More recent scholarship has taken a more nuanced view of the government’s 
commitment to assimilation, as well as its success. In her doctoral thesis, Kristy Ann 
Kokegai argued that the assimilationist policies of the 1950s should be seen as a 
building block for Australian multiculturalism, rather than as the xenophobic and 
doctrinaire policy which they were once thought to be. According to Kokegai, 
‘assimilation became increasingly occupied with the provision of practical settlement 
assistance and the creation of new Australian citizens’, rather than strict absorption 
into the dominant Anglo-Celtic culture.246  Gwenda Tavan, a political scientist at La 
Trobe University, similarly argued that assimilation was a transitional doctrine 
between the mono-cultural Anglo-Australian past and the multicultural future, which 
allowed Australians ‘to  make  sense   of, contain,   and   ultimately   accept  social  and   
cultural  change,  by  gradually,  if equivocally,  incorporating  the  reality  of  an  
ethnically  mixed  population  into popular  conceptions  of  the  Australian nation.’247 
The proliferation of ethnic enclaves, limited resourcing for migrant social services, 
and the very small number of individuals deported from Australia for not meeting the 
strict obligations attached to migration have all been pointed to as evidence that the 
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assimilationist policy acted very differently in practice to the rhetoric on which it was 
based.248  
 
Despite these qualifications, there are two indisputable outcomes of the post-war 
migration boom. Firstly, it introduced to Australia large numbers of men, women, and 
children who did not speak English as a first language. Secondly, it necessitated a 
major expansion in education and community assistance for migrants, officially or 
semi-officially, to further the aim of integration and help migrants become active 
participants in the Australian economy and society. A large part of this expansion in 
education was, naturally enough, a boost in the number of qualified teachers to 
service a dramatically expanding population, alongside an expansion of access to 
higher education to further develop citizens with specialist and technical skills. 
Teacher training was significantly curtailed during the war, as young people enlisted 
or found war-related employment. A low birth-rate in the 1930s was also beginning 
to make itself felt from 1948.249 The Review of Education in Australia, 1948 -1954, 
produced by the Australian Council on Education Research, makes it clear that most 
state systems were dramatically understaffed and continued functioning only due to 
the unsustainable reliance on temporary teachers. These temporary teachers were 
not preferred employees of the education system, with many either underqualified to 
teach or married women, who were generally obliged by discriminatory rule and 
convention to work in schools close to their home. All the state governments and the 
Commonwealth invested significantly in expanding access to teacher training to scale 
up the potential workforce.250 
 
There are direct links between the assimilationist projects of the post-war years and 
the way that the Scheme operated. Certain skills and interests were fostered in 
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Australians, not just those undergoing teacher training, through participation in 
assimilationist projects.  
 
These skills included language instruction as well as managing cultural diversity, 
both skills that held a new value during the post-war boom. One of the most common 
experiences that applicants highlighted in support of their participation in the 
Scheme was experience in assimilating ‘New Australians’. Kenneth Milne, previously 
discussed for his political views, highlighted the two years of experience he had 
teaching ‘English to 'New Australians' (Dutch German Italian)’ in his application.251 
Applicant Keith Stodden was able to point to the ‘good 100 hrs English tuition’ that he 
had performed on behalf the Department of Immigration.252 Fay Gilding wrote of the 
‘wide experience’ that she felt prepared her for a term of service in Indonesia, which 
comprised ‘Sunday school + youth work’ as well as ‘social work among New 
Australians’.253  
 
Lois Griffiths could present more than five years of experience with migrant 
education to the Scheme as proof of her competence to work in Indonesia. Starting as 
a Migrant Education Instructor in English at the Bonegilla Migrant Reception and 
Training Centre, Griffiths progressed to the position of Chief Instructor at the Greta 
Commonwealth Immigration Centre in NSW before taking a position teaching English 
to General Motors Holden factory workers.254 In 1956, Neale Hunter could turn to the 
job he held as a teacher of English to Greek migrants to bolster his application.255 
Eight years later another Hunter, Joan Mabel Hunter, could put forward an 
impressive résumé of work with migrants: teaching English in the Mildura and Sale 
migrant centres in 1951 and 1952, work in the Commonwealth Office of Education 
preparing textbooks and study aids for migrant education in 1953 and 1954, and 
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from 1956 onwards private coaching, special classes, and providing migrant 
education to large organisations including Imperial Chemical Industries, Australian 
Glass Manufacturers, and the Victorian Railways Union.256 
 
These individuals were not just groping for any intercultural experiences in their 
lives. There was direct translation of the skills and techniques learned in Australia’s 
post-war assimilation programs which could then be applied to work in Indonesia. 
The social web of the VGS, centred as it was in the ASCM, intersected with the social 
networks of young Student Christians who were involved in the Good Neighbour 
Councils, which were also endorsed by the ASCM.257  
 
These intersections reveal some of the ways that the experience of intercultural 
understanding in Indonesia was a successor, as Mackie argued, to intercultural 
interactions arising from post-war migration. For example, Betty Feith’s 
correspondence with Lois Griffiths, a potential applicant to the VGS working at the 
Bonegilla immigration centre, reveals how Australian experiences with non-English 
speaking migrants was considered directly equivalent to teaching English overseas. 
After Betty Feith provided Griffiths with material and information on her work for 
the English Language Inspectorate in the Indonesian Ministry of Education, Griffith 
enthused that: 
My fellow instructors here are greatly impressed with the syllabus ... We haven’t seen 
anything that so closely approaches the methods we use for teaching English as a 
foreign language. I’m taking it up to the C’wealth Office of Education in Sydney – not 
only will they be interested, but it might ensure greater cooperation from that Office.258 
This small interaction highlights the links between experiences gained through these 
assimilationist projects of the post-war years and the VGS. A person involved in 
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migrant education in Australia could look upon the work of English language teachers 
in Indonesia and see something familiar.  
 
Even though the circumstances surrounding English language instruction in Australia 
and Indonesia were vastly different, the practices that underpinned such work were 
something that could be shared, compared, and applied across such starkly differing 
circumstances. It is the presence of shared experiences that create a direct link 
between the post-war migration and engagement in Indonesia, where practices that 
arose to deal with the new problem of managing cultural diversity in Australia are 
then echoed and mimicked in Indonesia. The uncomfortable practice of performing 
nonsensical songs like ‘Three Blind Mice’ to teach English to adults in the Australian 
immigration system and government workers in Indonesia, reflects a deeper 
connection than merely history rhyming.259  
  
This link between the post-war migration boom and Australian engagement with Asia 
can be extended even further, to the discourses that underlay both the Good 
Neighbour movement and the VGS itself. Both justified intercultural interaction as an 
essential element of ‘neighbourliness’ and hospitality, which were in turn presented 
as essential elements of Australian national identity. The idea of Indonesia as 
Australia’s ‘nearest neighbour’ – and virtuous Australians demonstrating neighbourly 
friendship, hospitality, and understanding – was a central ideological impulse behind 
the VGS.  
 
In the foreword to the first edition of Djembatan, the VGS was introduced as a ‘family’ 
doing their bit for Australia’s neighbours, in a spirit of mateship.260 In the fourth 
edition Jim Webb explained the origins of the Scheme as being a corrective to the 
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collapse of Western domination of Asia, which had left Australians ‘ill-prepared … to 
live alongside the newly independent Asian nations’.261 Thanks to the isolation which 
had only recently ended, Webb noted, ‘only one member of the present Australian 
Cabinet has ever visited our nearest Asian neighbour and then only for a few days’.262 
The arrival of Asian students as part of the Colombo Plan had created space for 
‘friendship and understanding’ within Australia, but the Scheme would ‘enable 
attitudes of mutual goodwill and respect to develop’ beyond this easy isolation of 
Australia.263 
 
David Walker has previously highlighted the significance of ‘neighbourly’ discourses 
to the development of Australian national identity, writing that in the decades up to 
the early 1960s, Australia increasing engagement with Asia meant that ‘it was no 
longer sufficient to express goodwill, it was increasingly necessary to find ways of 
representing goodwill as an Australian attribute’.264 What emerged from this need for 
an improved image in Asia was the adoption of a rhetoric of hospitality associated 
with the Australian bush but which had the potential to also ‘inspire a new and more 
racially inclusive spirit of regional engagement’.265 This rhetoric had several benefits. 
Chief amongst them, it raised practical action to the status of ideological principle. 
Australians could be lauded for the ways in which their temperament and everyday 
activities demonstrated the good character and openness of Australian society. To 
bolster their projects, advocates could point to the friendly treatment of guests and 
neighbours – without having to engage in lengthy debates about the principles 
underpinning White Australia. Through this intellectual sleight of hand, Menzies 
could earnestly declare that ‘of course’ Australians aren’t racist, even as he defended 
race-based immigration restrictions.266  
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Walker connected the neighbourliness that was expressed in external affairs with the 
neighbourliness towards recent migrants encouraged through the ‘Good Neighbour 
Councils’.267 Within several years, the same organisations that were mobilised to be 
good neighbours within Australia were giving enthusiastic backing to the VGS and its 
campaign to be good neighbours to those outside Australia. The Good Neighbour 
Councils served as community agents for government policy, encouraging the 
assimilation project through connecting with new migrants and providing services to 
further their integration. Its objectives were framed around good will and 
neighbourliness, such as the objective ‘By close collaboration and work of all 
concerned to do everything possible to secure mutual reciprocal understanding and 
goodwill and practical neighbourliness by Australians and immigrants’.268 The Good 
Neighbour movement has mostly been looked upon as a failure. Inadequately 
supported, inadequately trained, and inadequately informed, the volunteers could do 
little more than take a superficial ‘handshake and cup of tea’ approach, as one 
opponent of assimilation decried.269  
 
Nonetheless, these Councils, which could boast 10,000 members in over 100 
branches by January 1954, were effective in promoting the benefits of immigration 
and cross-cultural interaction among Australians.270 The Good Neighbour movement 
and the VGS shared more than similar slogans.  They both drew in volunteers from 
the same networks of church groups and voluntary organisations that pre-existed in 
Australian society. All major Christian denominations, as well as the ASCM separately, 
gave their enthusiastic backing to the Good Neighbour Councils.271 Within several 
years, these same organisations were mobilised to support the establishment of the 
VGS, by some of their own members.  
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Neighbourliness was not just a discursive tool for promoting the Scheme; 
neighbourliness was a shield against criticism. When it appeared in 1952 that the 
government would be challenged in the Commonwealth Parliament over its (not yet 
finalised) support for the VGS, Herb Feith wrote to the Melbourne Committee to 
outline his view on the matter. Feith wrote that when he was first made aware that 
there might be a political problem raised by the government supporting the Scheme, 
‘my mind immediately went back to all the times I’d told people the WAP [White 
Australia Policy] was racial, etc. etc.’, but still, ‘even if political opposition were to go 
to the length of a question in the House, I wouldn’t be perturbed. I think Bob [Robert 
Menzies] would trounce ‘em with goodneighbourly oratory if it got to that’.272  
 
‘Neighbourly’ language was not just used by officials and advocates, the individual 
attracted to the VGS made the same connection. Many applicants to the Scheme 
expressed their interest in Indonesia via attitudes of neighbourly goodwill. For 
example, Lois Griffiths wrote that ‘Friendship with numerous Asian students in 
Australia has increased the conviction I have long held that nothing could be of 
greater value than cooperation and understanding between Australia and 
neighbouring countries’.273 Another applicant wrote that she wanted to take part in 
the Scheme because she wanted to ‘help in bettering Australian relations with our 
Asian neighbours’.274 Yet another saw the Scheme as an opportunity to ‘live with, and 
make friendships among, the Indonesian people, and to gain an understanding of our 
nearest neighbour’.275 This demonstrates that the Scheme was not just making the 
connection between neighbourliness and working in Indonesia, it was attracting 
individuals who already understood practical action and intercultural understanding 
in that way.  
 
The VGS had tapped into a changing understanding of the world among Australian 
citizens. This change had been spurred, in part, by the changes within Australian 
                                                                    
272 H. Feith to D. Anderson and B. Evans, 05.02.1952, “VGS Papers”, item 52. 
273 “Lois Griffiths”, 29.07.1954, “VGS Papers”, item 5. 
274 “Janice McPhee”, 22.10.1954, “VGS Papers” item 5. 
275 “Alison Williams”, 13.07.1955, “VGS Papers”, item 14. 
101 
 
society itself. These changes, however, highlighted a contradiction that the VGS had to 
face: in creating a bridge of friendship between Indonesia and Australia, a decision 
had to be made as to who was qualified to call themselves Australian. 
  
The VGS and ‘Australian’ identity  
The VGS, in its position as a conduit for Australian-Indonesian relations, also had to 
grapple with the question of what defined an ‘Australian’. This was a complex 
question, in which the answers were neither self-evident nor universal. It may seem 
contradictory for a program whose pioneer and lead organiser was a refugee from 
continental Europe, but the VGS was at times reluctant to treat migrant Australians as 
legitimate representatives of Australia in Indonesia. This can be seen in the treatment 
of applications from ‘New Australians’ submitted to the Scheme. A formula of 
naturalisation and identification with Australia was central to how the Scheme 
handled applications from people not born in Australia. British migrants, close to the 
Anglophone culture, were eligible after a year’s residence in Australia. Non-British 
migrants were informed that, in general, they must be naturalised before being 
considered for the VGS. 
 
This formula of naturalisation and identification with Australia was not the complete 
story. Frederik Louis van Emmerik was an Indies-born migrant who arrived in 
Australia in late 1952, taking advantage of the Migration Agreement between the 
Australian and Dutch Governments. His naturalisation was confirmed in October 
1958, a more rapid than average progress from ‘New Australian’ to Australian for the 
time. Van Emmerik, who had completed a degree in Engineering with Honours at the 
University of Tasmania in 1956, applied to the VGS in May, 1959. An ASCM member, 
his stated reasons for applying included that he had realised ‘that the Dutch have 
exploited Indonesia and a wish to do at least something about it’.276 When asked 
about his associations with Asian students or Asian affairs, he wrote that at university 
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he had ‘always felt closer to Asian students than Australians, possible due to shared 
language difficulties’.277  
 
He was, nevertheless, aware that his ‘colonialist’ background may be a disqualifying 
factor, and asked to be told quickly whether or not to pursue other opportunities.278 
A month later, the reply from Melbourne outlined the Scheme’s position: 
As far as we are concerned, of course, your ‘colonialist’ past makes no difference, but as 
each application must pass a long line of Indonesians, it is probable that someone who 
handles it will have anti-Dutch prejudices sufficiently strong to reject your application, 
or at least delay it indefinitely. In addition, even if you did go under the Scheme, your 
Dutch name and background would probably make it much more difficult for you to 
‘identify’ yourself with Indonesians, which is the basic aim of the Scheme. Of course all 
of us have been taken for a Dutchman initially, but you would undoubtedly find it 
harder to explain your position than we did.279  
Replying to his specific request to work in Bandung, the Acting Secretary advised van 
Emmerik that ‘you would almost invariable be regarded as just another Dutchman 
there to make money out of Indonesia, and very few would believe you were 
receiving only an Indonesian salary’.280 It does not appear that van Emmerik’s 
application was progressed any further, while a subsequent meeting between the 
Chair of the VGS and Indonesian Embassy officials affirmed that such an applicant 
should be discouraged.281 
 
At play in the treatment of this application are distinct ideas of identity. Van Emmerik 
identified himself as an Australian on his application and was a naturalised citizen. 
This, in principle, placed him on a level footing with locally-born citizens. More than 
this, the policy of assimilation encouraged migrants to identify totally with Australia 
and leave their old allegiances behind. One book aimed at encouraging British 
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migration to Australia declared that any migrant to Australia must ‘mix well, to adapt 
himself to new conditions quickly, to forget in large measure many of the things to 
which he has been used at home, to learn a new mode of speech, to think in terms of 
new standards’.282 Van Emmerik was also a member of one of the largest ethnic 
groups within an increasingly diverse Australia in the 1950s: the Netherlands was the 
fourth largest provider of migrants to Australia during the early phases of the post-
war migration boom, to the extent that the Prime Minister Menzies paid tribute to the 
contributions of Dutch migrants to Australian society on a visit to the Netherlands in 
1955.283 But he could never represent Australian friendship to Indonesians. 
Burdened with a ‘very Dutch’ name, his background was presumed to undercut his 
ability to ‘identify’ with Indonesians or be identified as ‘Australian’. The 
representation of Australia that the Scheme projected instead looked back to a period 
uncomplicated by the changing demographics of Australia itself, even as those same 
changes pushed Australia outward to Asia.  
 
There were also issues around British migrant applicants to the Scheme, although 
‘British’ and ‘Australian’ identities were mixed and overlapped for many Australians 
in the 1950s. This confusion and lack of differentiation can be seen playing out in the 
VGS. A very revealing choice of categories in an article published in Djembatan hints 
at how identities were in flux for the volunteers. In ‘Teaching in Tondano (Sulawesi)’, 
Sylvia Graham recounted her experiences in the English Department of a Teacher’s 
Training College. Graham described how the college had four full-time lecturers, 
‘three Britishers and an Indonesian’284 Graham then moved to clarify that the three 
‘Britishers’ were not actually British nationals. Rather, ‘Britishers’ was a wider 
category which included the two Australians working at the College through the VGS: 
Sylvia and her future husband, the Adelaide-born Lindsay Cleland.285 Most applicants 
who nominated a nationality and born in Australia identified as ‘British’ rather than 
‘Australian’, reinforcing a fluid sense of national identity that was not yet distinct 
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from an imperial worldview.286 The confused role British migrants played as 
representatives of Australia could even be the subject of jokes in the pages of 
Djembatan: the accent of Welsh-born Ken Thomas, readers were told, ‘intrigues 
Indonesians even more than an ordinary Australian one does’.287 
 
Despite these blurred categories, it was clear in practice that there was a distinction 
between being ‘British’ and ‘Australian’. Ollie McMichael wrote that the British could 
not help Indonesia because of the legacy of empire: ‘No country matters more to 
Indonesia than we do. Britain and Holland – NO – colonial countries. America – NO – 
imperialist. – Russia – NO – imperialist. If Australia fails – they’ll turn to China’.288 His 
concerns were well placed; Ivan Southall makes clear that Australians and Britons 
were treated differently by Indonesians due to the dispute between the United 
Kingdom and Indonesia over Malaya, which escalated into armed conflict by the early 
1960s. Surveying the behaviour of the ‘ugly’ anti-British mobs that arose during the 
konfrontasi period, Southall notes that ‘the British were unerringly selected for this 
form of treatment, while all other whites, even “British” subjects, such as Australians 
and Canadians, were untouched’.289 When two British migrants applied to participate 
in the Scheme, they were told that they had not been in Australia long enough to be 
considered. It was decided that they could not possibly represent an Australia that 
they had not really experienced, even though they had valuable skills to offer 
Indonesia. When they applied directly to the Indonesian Government to work outside 
the VGS, the Indonesian Embassy was told in no uncertain terms that the VGS 
disclaimed all responsibility for them.  
 
It was Indonesia that had undergone a nationalist revolution, and was engaging in the 
process of creating a national identity. But the sense of identity that the VGS 
presented to Indonesia was also grounded in debates around national identity and 
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participation in society. The VGS was not just trying to find volunteers who could 
come to identify with their Indonesian counterparts or perform the work. They were 
also searching for volunteers who conformed to their vision of Australian identity, 
one which was a simplified projection of the complexities of Australian society and – 
at least in some respects – had not fully divested itself from older visions of the world 
underpinned by Empire. These were essential elements of the process of 
‘identification’ that was so important to those who ran the VGS, but identification as 
‘Australian’ was only one element. As the next section shows, gender was also an 
important factor in the way that the VGS approached its mission and regarded its 
participants. 
 
Intimacy, Gender, and Race in the Volunteer Graduate Scheme 
While the White Australia Policy and its ideological underpinnings are 
overwhelmingly characterised by their racialized background, it also drew upon a 
deeply gendered view of the world. In fact, gender has always been intimately tied to 
the ideal of a White Australia. As historian Stuart Macintyre noted:  
The Australian nation was shaped by fear of invasion and concern for the purity 
of the race. These anxieties converged on the female body as nationalist men 
returned obsessively to the safety of their women from alien molestation, while 
doctrines of racial purity, no matter how scientific, rested ultimately on 
feminine chastity.290  
Macintyre continues that women themselves took on a ‘maternalist’ conception of 
citizenship, ‘which took emancipation from masculine tyranny as a necessary 
condition of their vital contribution to the nation-state’.291 The VGS had many female 
participants, and as will be shown, views within the organisation changed as women 
voluntarily stepped outside the barriers (or, more precisely, borders) that kept them 
from ‘alien molestation’. 
  
                                                                    
290 Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, 3rd ed., Cambridge Concise Histories (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 149. 
291 Macintyre, A Concise History of Australia, 149. 
106 
 
This chapter has so far looked at changes in Australian society and senses of identity 
which encouraged a deeper engagement with Asia, but the limitations of such 
engagement in the imagination of volunteers can also be seen through the gendered 
anxieties they expressed. Through the Scheme, men and women were exposed to 
something different to the male wage earner household then hegemonic in Australian 
society, and their experiences highlighted differences between gender roles in middle 
class Australia and Indonesia, providing another challenge to the ‘maternalist’ model 
of women’s participation in White Australia. Exposure caused anxiety, but also meant 
that the VGS was an outlet for critical reflection, at times, of gender and work. This 
section will illuminate some of these issues by looking at two challenges to the 
Scheme’s call for intercultural friendship and engagement triggered by the 
participation of women: the challenges of intimacy, loyalty, and equality that were 
brought into stark relief by the interracial marriages that arose from the Scheme; and 
the questions around maturity, safety, and autonomy brought about by the presence 
of young ‘unaccompanied’ women in the Scheme.  
 
Intimacy, loyalty, and equality 
The Scheme was based on the principle that personal connection and friendship 
could be the basis for intercultural understanding. This personal connection, the 
creators of the VGS were acutely aware, held within it the real possibility of intimate 
relationships across intercultural boundaries. Rather than something to be 
celebrated, as it would later be, this initially created alarm – expressed as an anxiety 
that female volunteers would be a problem for the Scheme, which needed to be 
managed. In one of his first letters back to Melbourne, Herb Feith sounded a warning, 
writing that there are:    
Too many girls! Weell [sic], well, what is one to say? Isn’t it likely that parental attitudes 
will thin out the numbers considerably? But did you Don stress the “matriamonial” [sic] 
aspect? It is a problem you know. Two years is a long time to be without someone to 
whom one’s attached back in Australia, and if on the other hand one gets seriously 
interested in somebody here there’s the problem of not being able to go back to 
107 
 
Australia with a colored spouse – quite apart from all the other problems of mixed 
marriages. (the b…. White Australia Policy).292 
In this formulation, from a man with relatively progressive credentials, female 
applicants could not win: they were either ‘attached’ back home, and therefore 
unlikely to last the minimum two years of service, or they were unattached – and 
therefore likely to cause headaches. It was irrelevant who they were as individuals or 
their personal circumstances.  To remove any doubt about the gendered nature of 
these concerns, any ‘problem’ of men becoming attached to Indonesian women seems 
to have been left entirely out of consideration. 
 
Objections to mixed-race marriages were rarely based explicitly on racial grounds, in 
keeping with the Australian discourses which rejected concepts of superiority while 
maintaining separation. Ailsa Zainu’ddin (née Thompson, and known in the ASCM as 
‘Tommy’) met and married Zainu’ddin (‘Din’, who was working for the Indonesian 
Embassy at the time) in Australia. In an oral history interview given in 2006, she 
described the reactions of her family and friends to news of her marriage to a Muslim 
Indonesian. Zainu’ddin recalled that her sister was initially troubled by the prospect 
of her interracial marriage – and having mixed-race children. When asked by the 
interviewer whether this opposition was what the interviewer described as a 
‘standard’ biological racist objection, Zainu’ddin was emphatic that this was not so – 
rather, it was concern that mixed-race children would be ‘social misfits’ accepted by 
neither parents’ culture.293 This construction – not of openly racial opposition, but of 
social and cultural concerns – can be taken as a reflection of the background of the 
mostly middle class, mostly Protestant volunteers of the Scheme. 
 
The Department of External Affairs was clearly alarmed by the marriages, and 
considered any woman who married an Indonesian automatically excluded from the 
program, and thus unable to claim any of the assistance that the Australian 
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Government provided to the Scheme. This issue caused a significant crisis when a 
volunteer, Joan Minogue, reapplied to the program after completing a term of service 
in Indonesia. In an informal interview with staff at the Australian Embassy in 
Indonesia, she was asked whether her intention in remaining in Indonesia was to 
marry an Indonesian. ‘Unaware that it may be used against her’, Minogue answered 
in the affirmative, despite being advised that she need not answer the question.294  
 
This information was relayed to the section of the Department of External Affairs 
which managed the Colombo Plan. The Department declined to conduct a formal 
interview with Minogue, a necessary step in the application process. The matter was 
taken up by the National Committee, who viewed it as an existential threat to the 
Scheme and a direct challenge to the Scheme’s aims, and warranted a face to face 
meeting in which the Chair and Secretary of the VGS made representations on behalf 
of Minogue, a core member of the Scheme. This meeting was minuted in detail, with 
the arguments and counter-arguments of the VGS and the Department demonstrating 
the stark division in the treatment of interracial marriage. In the first instance, the 
Department asserted that loyalty and liability to remain in Indonesia were primary 
considerations: 
It appeared to me that E.A. had no clear cut reason for rejecting Joan except the 
intention to marry. When pressed, two points emerged, firstly that a person who 
marries an Indonesian would have divided loyalty between the two countries, and 
secondly that it was not reasonable for the Australian Government to pay the fares, etc. 
of a person who was likely not to return who may change citizenship. Reference was 
made to the educational role returning volunteer graduates have in Australia.295  
 
Both assertions pre-supposed a gendered deference to the husband in matters of 
loyalty and of location, and diminished the value of the possible contributions that 
women could make to the Scheme. The VGS representatives protested, pointing to the 
existing policy which provided that graduates who marry during their period of 
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service remained active in the program and eligible for repatriation expenses. They 
were left to feel that: 
There is no clear and accurate policy by E.A.  Some officers I think, would say that 
marriage generally need not contradict the aims of the Scheme; [E.A. officer] Truelove 
on the other hand feels that marriage with Indonesians is undesirable but that nothing 
can be done to stop persons becoming engaged and marrying in Indonesia, hence the 
above rules. The discussion about marriage and divided loyalty made me feel that the 
officers present were very woolly on the aims of the Scheme and the reasons for the 
Australian Government supporting such a Scheme.  
I attempted to make and have accepted the point that in assessing a candidate, total 
motivation with respect to the aims of the Scheme was the proper criterion and that 
intention to marry may or may not be relevant. This point was not acceptable; it was 
felt that the intention to marry would in itself make a person unacceptable.296  
A final pitch was then made to the officers on the grounds that Joan Minogue would 
most likely still go to Indonesia without government assistance, and her rejection 
from the Scheme for the sole reason of marrying an Indonesian would harm the 
public image of both the Scheme and the Australian Government. Again, the 
Department refused to yield. Tellingly, the VGS made it clear to the Australian 
Government that they would continue their opposition to this on principle, continue 
to associate with Joan Minogue, and even consider funding her without further 
approval.  
 
Unlike Cold War politics or ethnicity, which had previously excluded individuals from 
the Scheme, by 1959 the idea of interracial marriage as something bound up in the 
aims of the Scheme was firmly in place. The minutes of the next meeting of the 
National Committee reported that the Chair of the VGS, Don Anderson, wrote to the 
E.A. after the face-to-face meeting affirming three points of principle that the Scheme 
maintained: 
                                                                    




(a) That we feel that in assessing a candidate, total motivation with respect to the aims 
of the Scheme is the proper criterion and that intention to marry an Indonesian 
need not necessarily disqualify a person.  
(b) That the contribution towards the aims of the Scheme that a person marrying an 
Indonesian can make might, over a period of years, far exceed the efforts of a single 
person during one term. The three girls who have so far married Indonesians have 
continued to advance our aims after marriage.  
(c) That the suggestion by E.A. that marriage would give rise to divided loyalties 
indicates a very limited view of the Scheme. We feel that divided loyalties are 
inherent in a Scheme such as this for graduates are at the same time Australian 
citizens and public servants of the Indonesian Government.297     
Herb Feith’s initial anxieties around mixed race intimacy within the VGS were not a 
permanent feature. Rather, the interracial marriages that came out of the Scheme, 
four in total, soon became something worthy of celebration, and another opportunity 
to demonstrate in a practical way the anti-racism of the project. In celebrating 
‘international’ marriages, the women of the VGS also highlighted the positive aspects 
of the perceived gender egalitarianism of the Indonesian middle-classes they worked 
alongside and with whom they lived. 
Thelma Rungkat (née Ashton), who had married Indonesian civil servant Richard 
Rungkat, wrote an article for the third edition of Djembatan on what it meant to be 
married to an Indonesian. In it, the gender relations between man and woman are 
never the source of conflict, but rather a source of pride and mutual respect. But they 
are also assisted by the servants who customarily perform much of the housework 
with which contemporary Australian wives were occupied: 
Like Australian husbands, Indonesians like a good meal after a hard-working day and 
the servant who can give him food “just like mother’s servant makes” is a jewel to be 
handled carefully and with deep respect. Such is at present my reward. Fortunately my 
husband does not demand intricate Indonesian dishes on all occasions – I should never 
be able to provide it myself – but on many occasions he enjoys Australian food as well. 
Thus I get a chance to do a little cooking in my beautiful kitchen, complete with gas 
stove and plenty of fresh air and light – but it is never an obligation on a day when I 
come home weary from the heat and stuffiness of the office. It is delightful to come 
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home to a clean neat flat with the daily washing and the ironing done, and to be able to 
rest for a few hours before sitting down with one’s husband to a pleasantly served meal 
and then – joy of joys! – no washing up to be done afterwards.298 
 
Far from the orientalist depictions of oppressed and submissive women, Thelma 
Rungkat highlights the respect that married women received in the workplace. In 
sharp distinction to the accepted practices in Australia, married women in Indonesia, 
even pregnant women, continue working: 
One of the nice things about family planning in Indonesia is that working wives can 
plan to go on working up till and after the baby’s birth. Three month’s leave with full 
pay is the Indonesian government’s way of recognising the dependence of the family on 
the salary of both partners. This gives one the chance to start the baby off well in life for 
the first three months, and it is usually possible to find a younger member of one’s 
family connections to act as nursemaid after that time while husband and wife are at 
work. Working during pregnancy is so accepted that no-one is either surprised or 
embarrassed and every effort is made to help you feel comfortable during this time at 
the office or at home – husband, servant, family, friends are all considerate.299 
This article marks a trend of using the very same mix-gender intimacy which was 
considered a ‘problem’ to humanise the Indonesian other, present a conscious 
rejection of White Australia, and highlight egalitarianism on not just racial but gender 
lines. By the time that Ivan Southall was collecting information on the Scheme for 
Indonesia Face to Face his interviewees had the language of the American civil rights 
movement to support mixed race marriages. The volunteers proclaimed that mixed-
race marriages were the best way to prevent any more ‘Little Rocks’ – shorthand for 
the crisis provoked by the desegregation of Little Rock High School in the United 
States. The logical outcome of these relationships – mixed-race children – would be 
the bridge between two cultures such that there would be no more suspicion and 
animosity bred from ignorance.  
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The relationships themselves were held up as something different, transcending 
typical power relations and holding out hope for a relationship of full equals. For 
Thelma Rungkat, the ‘international’ marriage was taking the equality of nations from 
the public sphere into the private sphere. She wrote: 
“I suppose,” she says, “many marriages in Indonesia are contracted now by free choice 
between the two people concerned, but few are quite so dependent upon the very deep 
and equal regard of two people as the international marriage, which, even in the 
marriage laws of the country, is recognized as having a unique equality between the 
partners concerned. Without mutual support, who would go through all the difficulties 
and surmount all the obstacles involved with personal, legal and national 
connections?”300 
Three decades after her time in Indonesia, Ailsa Zainu’ddin would, tongue in cheek, 
endorse cross-cultural marriages as a way to safely challenge the expectations of both 
societies, telling an audience at the Monash Centre for Southeast Asian Studies ‘I will 
put in a plug for cross cultural marriages because it does mean that you can make 
your own rules and take what you like from either side and you will be excused in 
what you do by that that you are married to one of ‘these strange foreigners’’.301 
 
This remarkable transition from outright hostility to the ‘problem’ of interracial 
marriages to the outright defence of them as being aligned with the aims of the 
Scheme, and maybe even exceeding non-intimate relations in furthering them, 
reflects the changing ways in which gender could be used as a front in the opposition 
to White Australia – as deeply embedded gendered anxieties were overcome. While 
the Scheme and the Australian Government found their values and discourses aligned 
in matters of ‘neighbourliness’, they were at cross-purposes: the VGS were self-
described ‘cranks’ when it came to the White Australia Policy, while the Australian 
Government used neighbourliness to defend White Australia.302 When the intimate 
relations transgressed the racial barriers, with white Australians and non-white 
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Indonesians moving from neighbours to a single-family unit, the Australian 
Government could not support it, to the anger and bafflement of the Scheme’s 
administrators.   
 
Maturity, safety, autonomy 
Men and women were not treated the same, nor did they share the same experiences 
or share an understanding of their experiences in Indonesia. Women as a category of 
independent actors within the Scheme with specific concerns, were rarely discussed 
by the VGS. Documents, such as the ten-page primer on what to expect in Indonesia 
were written with no information on problems that women might experience due to 
their sex in Indonesia.303 There were misgivings about the safety of women 
volunteers, which caused significant delays in the applications of several women who 
intended to teach in the English Language Inspectorate. Joan Minogue and Noela 
Motum were initially denied approval to participate in the Scheme, as they were 
unaccompanied and ‘immature’ (under 21). It was only under the proviso that the 
women be placed together and with an experienced volunteer that the Department 
approved their participation in the Scheme.304 After their acceptance, there were 
lingering concerns about their safety and ability to integrate into the area to which 
they were posted. John Gare, writing from the perspective of the Djakarta-based 
volunteers, advised Webb that the city they were posted to was a ‘grim spot’, where 
friends of a ‘similar education etc.’ would be much harder to come by, white women 
on bicycles should expect to have ‘Belanda!’ [Dutch!] called out as they pass, and 
where dancing is strictly forbidden.305   
 
Whether they were in a rural area or in metropolitan Jakarta, women experienced the 
Scheme differently. Betty Feith wrote on the different, restricted experiences of 
female volunteers to Indonesia. Women experienced pressure to not leave their 
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residences alone, especially at night. It was at night that most socialising occurs in 
Indonesian society, after the end of the work day, leaving some female volunteers 
trapped in an unfulfilling cycle of having no friends and not being able to make 
friends due to restrictions on their movements. Feith recounts the experience of one 
female volunteer who lived in a hostel room: 
with uncommunicative young ladies, public servants, in another Ministry who spent 
almost no time in their room after offices anyway, whose only interest seemed to be 
clothes, who not only spoke no English but talked to each other very quickly, and who 
perhaps begrudged the newcomer’s presence in an already overcrowded room with 
large wardrobes shutting out the light and where there was obviously no room to put 
the Australian’s heavy ship luggage! The Australian men could at least wander off on 
their own but girls were expected to be with other people, especially at night!306 
But within this discomfort, there were also opportunities. Ailsa Zainu’ddin would 
later comment ‘I went expecting to find that women in Indonesia were more 
restricted than we were in Australia but I quickly found they already had equal pay 
and maternity leave, that married women did not have to retire on marriage, which 
they did here until 1956’.307  
 
This offered a different kind of autonomy and security than women could find in 
Australia. Elsewhere, anyone who picked up the first edition of Djembatan could have 
read Ailsa Zainu’ddin’s reassuring article about safety in Indonesia, written under her 
family name of Thomson. Given the sarcastic title ‘It’s dangerous to go to Indonesia!’, 
Zainu’ddin confronts the negative perception of Indonesia in Australian society: 
If you plan to visit Indonesia, you will be most exceptional if you don’t meet sooner or 
later the people who look aghast and say “But it’s dangerous to go to Indonesia.” Well-
meaning friends will be the bearers of the most diverse rumours all designed to 
illustrate this theme. “You’ll be stabbed in the back by a betjak boy in some dark and 
lonely Djakarta street. If you have to travel by betjak at night, don’t take your eye off the 
driver.” I was warned. It is plausible enough if you have never been there, but you don’t 
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have to be in Djakarta long to find that although there are many dark streets, there are 
no lonely ones – ask any courting couple!308 
Despite the obsession with protection, and the curtailment of autonomy compared to 
the male volunteers, participating in the Scheme still reflected a kind of freedom that 
was absent in the lives of many contemporary Australian women. Zainu’ddin finished 
the article by encouraging people to think of Indonesia as dangerous because of its 
allure for Australians, who will never want to leave.309 The back pages of Djembatan, 
where the Omong-Omong (gossip) section kept the friends of the Scheme up to date 
with the activities of volunteers, records the adventures that women were able to 
take thanks to their presence in Indonesia. Minogue and Motum, one edition 
reported, were ‘in the throes’ of learning to ride an old motorbike after holidaying in 
Bali.310 These same women were reported in the next edition to be in Djakarta for 
festivities and to catch up with friends.311 
 
Conclusion 
The way that the VGS interacted with the dominant concepts of White Australia 
reveals the impossibility of separating the internal changes in Australian society from 
the interactions that Australia had with the outside world, and especially the self-
perception of the nation’s place in Asia. The Scheme fed upon the dynamics of the 
post-war boom in migration, taking the structural changes required by the post-war 
boom in education and adopting the language of neighbourliness – meant to assuage 
fear of change – to challenge Australian insularity towards Asia. But this should not 
be taken as an immediate leap from White Australia to acceptance of 
multiculturalism, a policy which came into its own in the 1970s. The organisers of the 
Scheme may have been ‘cranks’ for White Australia, but they were closely tied to a 
half-way house of assimilationist politics, teaching migrants about the Australian way 
of life and expecting the volunteers to be sent to Indonesia to be familiar with the 
dominant Anglo-Australian culture, whether this represented the actual diversity of 
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Australian society or not. Dutch-born applicants could not have their background 
scrubbed, and there remained lingering attachments to the idea of a wider ‘Britisher’ 
identity, which suggests that national identity was not as fixed as the volunteers 
would have no doubt wanted. 
 
Challenging White Australia meant putting Australians into an unfamiliar social 
context, which provoked an appraisal of the role of gender and intimacy. The ‘cranks’ 
were not immune to reflexively wanting to protect and shelter women, and restrict 
the kind of friendship and understanding to be offered through the Scheme to a non-
intimate, preferably masculine kind. Thankfully – from a twenty-first century 
standpoint – the Scheme’s participants worked hard to defend interracial marriage as 
a new avenue for understanding and intercultural friendship, one which could have a 
far greater impact than short terms of service for the Indonesian Government. 
Interracial marriage, in short, became a point of distinction between the ideological 
neighbourliness of the Australian Government, which supported the Scheme but 
defended White Australia, and the Scheme itself, which saw familial bonds as the 




When Herb Feith took the stage in 1995, he focused on the singular importance that 
Molly Bondan had on his own life and, by extension, the VGS and everything that 
followed on from its brief existence. She had spent nearly a year, Feith realised in 
hindsight, testing him in their correspondence before agreeing to vouch for his bona 
fides with the Indonesian government. If he had failed to impress her then, the door 
may never have been opened for the other volunteers who followed. When he visited 
Bondan a decade later, when their disagreements over Sukarno were perhaps most 
acute, Feith was sure that he was at least one of her targets when she spoke of ‘what 
our foreign critics fail to understand’. In many ways, this reflects the contingent 
nature of the whole Scheme: all the hopes and plans percolating inside young 
activists like Feith could have easily come to nothing – the fate of many previously 
untested and idealistic proposals. At the crucial moment, though, Molly Bondan 
vouched for Herb Feith’s sincerity in wanting to help the Indonesian Republic, and 
that was enough.  
 
The simplicity of the Scheme’s core ideals belied the complexity of the situation with 
which these individuals were faced. Bridging the divide between Australia, insular 
and self-professedly white, and Indonesia, long the subject of colonial domination and 
advocate of Afro-Asian solidarity, was as daunting then as it seems to contemporary 
eyes. Faced with an irreconcilable divergence between what they hoped to achieve 
and what was possible in the circumstances with which they were presented, the VGS 
was neither a definitive success nor an outright failure. Even so, it became a vehicle 
through which experience was gained and lessons drawn for understanding and 
interacting across cultures. But to fully appreciate the VGS and its legacy, this 
understanding of the VGS requires the Scheme to be situated in its historical context. 
It is this historical perspective that this dissertation has set out to provide. 
 
The first chapter examined some of the factors that made the VGS feasible at the 
outset of the 1950s. The fate of the Scheme may very well have rested on Molly 
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Bondan’s assessment of Feith’s character, but this chapter demonstrated that there 
were several factors at play in the formation of the VGS and its transformation from 
general principle into a workable aid program. A sense of unrealised potential of 
Australian-Indonesian relations, amid the ‘disruptions’ caused by World War Two 
and its aftermath encouraged the search for interactions such as those imagined by 
the VGS. Bondan would have been familiar with this, as a stand out activist within 
Australia during the ‘honeymoon’ period in her own right. This was a general 
sentiment that found fertile ground in the ASCM. This organisation – well versed in 
‘practical action’, political as well as religious – provided a shared ideological 
background, a national infrastructure, and a network of influence to deliver a project 
of this size. The VGS only took shape, however, when the concept of ‘embedded 
technical assistance’ was taken up by a group of student activists, including Herb 
Feith, in Melbourne.  
 
The second chapter laid out the historical progress of the VGS, its composition, and 
whether the VGS was drawn from the ‘Chifley-admiring intellectual sub-culture of 
worldmindedness and political renewal’ with which Feith identified himself. From 
1950 to 1953, as the second chapter showed, the Scheme was faced with an 
ambivalent Australian government and the need to legitimate its own aims. After 
achieving that legitimacy, from 1953 until the end of the decade the Scheme reached 
its high point in terms of activity and reach. As the decade closed, however, the dark 
clouds that they saw as hanging over the Indonesian economic and political 
landscape were proving a greater obstacle to the Scheme than its administrators had 
supposed, and they were openly debating what role, if any, the VGS could have in the 
future. In terms of composition, this chapter showed that the Scheme never met its 
optimistic – some might say grandiose – expectations.  Even so the Scheme had 
demonstrated many strengths. The volunteer cohort was relatively gender balanced, 
with a large number of teachers. Geographically, their common experiences were 
centred on two cities: Melbourne, where the largest number of volunteers had 
attended university, and Jakarta, where the largest number of volunteers were 
posted. Finally, this chapter turned to the idea of a Chifley admiring sub-culture. 
While this was an accurate description of Feith and his own politics at the time – an 
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ardent Labor supporter well-read in liberal and moderate socialist thinking – this 
chapter outlined the ways in which evidence from the Scheme point to a much 
broader engagement with ‘worldmindedness’ and Indonesian nationalism than might 
be expected from something constrained by a particular sub-culture.  
 
This pluralism extended only so far, something which was taken up in detail in the 
latter two chapters. The third chapter explored the role of the Cold War in the history 
of VGS, in Australia and Indonesia. Rather than having little impact on the VGS, as has 
sometimes been argued, this chapter argued that the Cold War, in fact, to a significant 
extent shaped and hemmed in the Scheme. In Australia, this occurred most clearly 
through the selection process, which restricted radical participation in the Scheme 
and in one instance involved the vetoing of successful applicants by the anti-
communist Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey. The influence of the Cold War 
on the VGS was more insidious inside Indonesia itself, colouring the worldview, 
experiences, and connections that the volunteers brought to and took away from 
their service. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis focused on the place of identity and White Australia in 
the Scheme. This chapter demonstrated how White Australia was not just a fixed 
pillar of Australian government policy that the volunteers were taking a stand 
against. Integral to ‘White Australia’ were an array of dynamic national, ethnic, and 
gender identities that in turn influenced and shaped the Scheme and the experiences 
borne from it. This chapter focused on three roles for White Australia and identity in 
the Scheme. It first turned to the role that the mass immigration of non-English 
speaking Europeans after World War Two played in the Scheme’s appeal, showing 
how individuals connected their own experiences of change in post-war society to the 
Scheme’s declared ideals. It then looked at the problematic role of nationality in the 
Scheme, showing how one Australian citizen unable to participate because of ‘Dutch-
sounding’ name, the rules for ‘New Australians’ wishing to participate in the Scheme 
unclear, and lingering cross-over identification with ‘Britishers’ and Britishness 
among some participants – and most applicants.  
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The final aspect that the chapter examined was the role of gender in the Scheme. This 
section established how the VGS negotiated gender as part of its lived opposition to 
White Australia. The attitudes regarding mixed-race marriage and intimacy moved 
from fear that this would threaten the Scheme’s success to outright lobbying and 
promotion of ‘international’ marriages as a pure distillation of the ideals of the VGS. 
Contemporaneously, the experiences that women volunteers had in Indonesia 
spurred the articulation of different perspectives on the gendered norms of White 
Australia.  
 
This thesis, as the title suggests, has placed the VGS in a historical perspective. But the 
Scheme’s relevance extends beyond empirical scrutiny of this single organisation, to 
what it can tell us about the creation of knowledge and anti-racist activism in 
Australia. Placing the VGS in its historical context reveals the extent to which so much 
of our knowledge has been conditioned and structured by the historical context in 
which it was gained.   
 
No one is more revealing in this instance than Herb Feith himself. In The Decline of 
Constitutional Democracy, Feith marked a clear division of political actors in 
Indonesia between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity-makers’ – cutting across 
ideological distinctions to group those he saw as rational, liberal, and committed to 
the democratic rule of law against those he saw as committed to an emotional, 
revolutionary, or illiberal politics.  Elements of the political elite with whom he 
identified, such as Hatta and the Socialist Party, were lionised in their struggles 
against demagoguery. This was a model of Indonesian politics gained from his 
experiences under the Scheme, but is now considered incomplete. Discussions of the 
influence of Islamic forces on Indonesian politics are particularly subdued in his 
writings from this time, something that he was challenged on at the very conference 
at which he paid tribute to Molly Bondan. The framework Feith adopted was 
grounded in his personal experiences and biases as a liberal socialist, a Student 
Christian, and a bureaucrat working in a government agency populated by secular 
nationalists and other assorted ‘administrators’. Perhaps without realising it, an 
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almost sectarian view was put forward that influenced generations of thinking on 
Indonesian politics and society. Tracing the context for the experiences and 
information that comes together in the form of ‘expert knowledge’ in no way 
diminishes the rigour or value of such knowledge, but historians must feel 
comfortable critiquing knowledge and situating knowledge in its social context. 
 
The lessons to be drawn from the VGS for anti-racist activism in Australia are mixed, 
but ultimately hopeful. The 1950s are a period, as historian Anna Haebich has noted, 
with ‘a peculiar mix of contrasts – rapid change and conformity, exhilaration and fear’ 
– that resonate with the global climate today.  Even if Australia is a more 
multicultural and open society than it was halfway through the twentieth century, the 
need to ‘build bridges’ across cultural divides seems as pressing now as then. The 
same can be said of Australian attitudes towards Indonesia, which have improved 
little since the 1950s.312 
 
This thesis has contextualised the VGS within its specific historical time and place. By 
necessity this involved discussions regarding anti-communist screening, ethnic-based 
discrimination, and the role of gender in the Scheme’s operations which might be 
uncomfortable for anyone attempting to idolise the VGS. But these are elements of its 
historical context. If lessons are to be drawn from history, then the history of the 
Volunteer Graduate Scheme demonstrates that what seems fanciful, novel, even 
impossible, can have long lasting and positive impacts. There are many limitations 
imposed on those seeking to change something as deeply ingrained as the race- and 
ethnic-based ordering of societies, but new opportunities to confront and question 
this rise and fall. As the VGS shows, idealists who believe in practical action wield a 
potent weapon in their struggle. 
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